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Safeguarding the Democratic
Entitlement: A Proposal for United




Thousands of university students marched today through a western Nigerian
city to protest the fatal shooting of a wife of Moshood K. Abiola, the jailed
opposition leader .... The protesters sang anti-military songs and carried
placards calling on the United Nations to intervene and secure democracy for
the west African nation.1
Recognizing that the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference
in the internal affairs of any State should be respected in the holding of
elections .... 2
United Nations participation in the conduct of national elections has
become one of the most visible and concrete aspects of U.N. involvement in
the domestic affairs of independent countries today.3 The condict of free
and fair elections has been among the first orders of business in Third
World and former Socialist countries jettisoning unpopular governments.
4
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1. Nigerians Protest Death Of Top Dissident's Wife, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1996, at A6
[hereinafter Nigerians Protest] (emphasis added).
2. Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty and Non-Interference in the Inter-
nal Affairs of States in their Electoral Processes, G.A. Res. 48/124 ( 7), U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 243, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/124 (1995).
3. See UN-ran NATIONS CENTRE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, HuMAN RIGHTS AND ELECTIONS:
HANDBOOK ON THE LEGAL, TECHNICAL AND HuMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF ELEcnONs 2, U.N.
Doc. HR/P/PT/2 (1994). See also David Stoelting, The Challenge of U.N.-Monitored Elec-
tions in Independent Nations, 28 STAN. J. h'rr'L L. 371 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Howard W. French, West African Surprise: Peace Taking Root in Sierra
Leone, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1996, at Al; Bill Keller, One of Africa's Last Dictators Bows to
Democracy, N.Y. TrMEs, May 20, 1994, at Al; Larry Rohter, Guatemala Hopes Vote Ends
War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1995, at A16; Russia Votes, WASH. PosT,June, 16, 1996, at C6.
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Usually this means a request for campaign and poll monitoring, and in
some cases, technical, financial and security assistance from the U.N. In a
few cases, the U.N. has been asked to supervise the entire process.5 Since
1990, the U.N. has been involved in the conduct of elections in several
independent countries undergoing political transformations, including
Albania, Angola, Cambodia, Haiti, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicara-
gua, Romania, and South Africa.6 For these nascent democracies, the U.N.
imprimatur on elections serves now as a kind of international "Good
Housekeeping Seal of Approval."
7
U.N. involvement in elections in independent countries follows a
longer history of participation in elections in countries making transitions
from colonial rule to independence. 8 In contrast to its clear embrace of its
role in the decolonization context, U.N. acceptance of its responsibilities to
participate in the political processes of independent countries has been
grudging. When initially confronted with requests for participation in the
political processes of these countries, the organization was unwilling and
unprepared to respond.9 Slowly, however, the U.N. has begun to develop a
tenuous sort of institutional consensus on its new role in legitimizing gov-
ernance. Reflecting deep philosophical and operational reluctance among
U.N. members and within the U.N. bureaucracy to expand the organiza-
tion's role in promoting democratic governance, U.N. electoral interven-
tions have been limited to supposedly "well-defined circumstances ...
primarily in situations with a clear international dimension." 10 Mean-
5. The U.N. missions in Cambodia and Namibia were of this type. On Cambodia,
see UNrrED NATIONS, THE UNInTm NATIONS AND CAMBODIA, 1991-1995 (1995). (U.N. Blue
Book Series, Vol. I), and Nhan T. Vu, The Holding of Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia:
The Achievement of the United Nations' Impossible Mission, 16 MICH. J. ITr'r L. 1177
(1995). On Namibia, see Yvs BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES,
REFERENDA AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS 157-59 (1994); Namibia: Independence at Last, U.N.
CHRON., June 1990, at 4; Henry J. Richardson, III, Constitutive Questions in the Negotia-
tions for Namibian Independence, 78 AM. J. INT'L. L. 76 (1984).
6. See U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTs, supra note 3, at 2; Stoelting, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Joint Declaration of the Central American Presidents, U.N. SCOR, 44th
Ses., Annex, Agenda Item 34, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/44/140-S/20491 (1989) (statement of
former Nicaraguan leader, Daniel Ortega); Stoelting, supra note 3, at 379.
8. U.N. CENTRE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 2; see also Gregory H. Fox, The
Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539, 573-79
(1992); Stoelting, supra note 3, at 372, n.1.
9. In 1989, the U.N. Secretary-General acknowledged that the organization had
declined several requests from member countries for electoral assistance in the past. See
Letter dated 5 April 1989 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Gen-
eral Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 34, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/44/210,
(1989). See also Stoelting, supra note 3, at 372, 375. Stoelting cites two General Assem-
bly resolutions adopting conflicting positions on the U.N. role in national elections
passed on the same day. The first resolution supported U.N. electoral assistance to
member states. Id. at 374 (citing G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda
Item 110, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/150 (1991)). The second resolution warned about
"external influence" and "extraneous activities" in national elections. Id. (citing G.A.
Res. 45/151, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 110, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/151
(1991)).
10. G.A. Res. 46/137, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 98, addendum pt. 1, at 2,
U.N. Doc. A/46/721/Add.1 (1991). See Stoelting, supra note 3, at 374.
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while, the U.N. has begun to institutionalize its circumscribed role by cre-
ating an office within the U.N. Secretariat responsible for dealing with
requests for electoral assistance and coordinating U.N. responses. 1 '
It is important, however, for the U.N. to both expand and deepen its
commitment to human rights values by abandoning the international-
dimension requirement and moving the substance of its involvements
beyond what can be termed "electoralism."1 2 This Article argues that the
U.N. must transform its policy of limited involvement in the political affairs
of independent nations into a broader one of "democratic guardianship."
13
This new role is what the South African people under apartheid, the Hai-
tians who voted overwhelmingly for President Aristide, the demonstrating
Nigerian students cited above, and millions of other people around the
world who feel oppressed by their governments, have been expecting and
demanding of the United Nations.
On some occasions, the U.N. has indeed linked its limited electoral
engagements to efforts promoting human rights. 14 A glimmer of this
linkage can be discerned in a 1991 U.N. General Assembly resolution
which asserted that "periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and
indispensable element of sustained efforts to protect the rights and inter-
ests of the governed." 15 However, any link between U.N. involvement in
elections in independent countries and U.N. human rights obligations has
been secondary to other rationales and goals. 16 Specifically, the U.N. has
highlighted its responsibilities to maintain international peace and security
and to develop friendly relations among nations as the primary motiva-
11. G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 10, at 2. This resolution was passed with only four
dissents and shows a remarkable international consensus for an expansion of U.N.
responsibility to the direction of perhaps the most intrusive of human rights. As Profes-
sor Franck puts it, "Democracy, thus, is on the way to becoming a global entitlement,
one that increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective international
processes." Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 46 (1992). On the coordinating role of the new U.N. Electoral Assistance
Unit, see U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTs, supra note 3, at 2-3.
12. 1 use this term to describe the narrow U.N. focus on the ritualized aspects of
democracy: monitoring and providing technical support for political campaigns, ballot-
ing and vote counting.'
13. See infra Part III.
14. Notwithstanding the criticisms I make later about an underlying attitude of
rluct~nce to becoming involved in the domestic political processes of its members and
about the generally limited nature of its involvements, the U.N.'s performance, on those
occasions when it has participated in national elections, has been on the whole positive.
U.N. involvement generally has been consistent with, and in fact has enhanced the value
of, human rights commitments made by its members in the U.N. Charter and the princi-
pal human rights instruments derived from it. See, e.g., U.N. CHATER arts. 1(3), 55, 56;
see also INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS; INTERNATIONAL COVE-
NANT Or ECONOMIC, SocIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS.
15. G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 10, 1 3. See also U.N. CENrRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 3, at 1.
16. See generally HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LOST AGEnDA: HumAN RIGHTS AND U.N.
FIELD OPEaATIONS (1993). In 1993, Human Rights Watch issued a scathing critique
describing this approach as one in which a "low priority [is] given to human rights." Id.
at 1. See also Watchdog Group Says U.N. Fails to Defend Human Rights, UPI,June 2, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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tions or ends of its missions.17 These justifications subordinate human
rights considerations and minimize the U.N.'s critical human rights
responsibility. 18
One consequence of minimizing the importance of human rights in
U.N. electoral intervention 19 missions is that elections become discon-
nected from the goal of promoting enduring substantive changes in
affected societies and in the global community-most importantly, changes
that will preserve opportunities for future changes. U.N. electoral missions
have been ad hoc, reactive, and narrowly focused on solving the specific
international emergency of the moment-a fundamentally flawed approach
that ignores the dynamic interrelatedness of local, national, and global con-
ditions. As such, U.N. electoral missions have tended to emphasize the
formal acceptability of, and/or rituals associated with, political campaign-
ing, balloting and validation of political control. This approach promotes
an impoverished conception of democratic change to people who may have
placed very high hopes on the benefits of such a change.
20
This Article examines U.N. involvement in national elections in
independent nations. It primarily focuses on the justifications and con-
duct of such U.N. electoral interventions and the implications thereof. The
U.N.'s high-profile involvement in the conduct of "democratic" elections in
independent nations raises important questions about the appropriate role
of the U.N. in the post-Cold War era. Specifically, this involvement raises
questions about U.N. priorities and its capacity to both restrain govern-
17. See U.N. CENTRE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17-26. See also U.N. CHAR.
TR preamble and ch. I (Purposes and Principles) (the source of these U.N.
responsibilities).
18. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 16. On the U.N. human rights responsibil-
ities, see, in particular, U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3), listing one of the purposes of the United
Nations: "To achieve international co-operation . . . in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion"; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2), and arts. 55, 56, 62, 64,
and 68. For a brief discussion of how the U.N. Charter provides a foundation for the
promotion of human rights generally, see IAN BROWNuE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
"noAL. LAw 569-71 (4th ed. 1990).
19. The term intervention, when used in this Article, applies to any level of involve-
ment or interference by the U.N. in the relationship between a government and citizens
of a particular country with or without the approval of the government of that country.
This usage is broader than traditional international law usage of coercive interference in
the affairs of another state against either the wishes of the government of that state or
those of a large segment of the population. See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Inter-
vention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sover-
eignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (xx), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/
6014 (1966) (passed on Dec. 21, 1965); Richard Falk, Intervention Revisited: Hard
Choices and Tragic Dilemmas, THE NATION, Dec. 20, 1993, at 755 (offering an even more
restrictive definition of intervention, focusing on military power and political restructur-
ing as the goal of the intervenor). See also BURNS H. WESTON Er AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw AND WORLD ORDER 868 (2d ed. 1990).
20. See Catherine S. Manegold, Behind U.S. Shield, Aristide Copes with a Stripped
Nation, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1994, at Al; Nigerians Protest, supra note 1. See also Judith
Miller, America's Burden: At Hour of Triumph, Democracy Recedes As the Global Ideal,
N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 18, 1996, Sec. 4, at 1; William Minter, Angola and Mozambique: Elec-
tions No Panacea for Conflict Resolution, AFRICA DEMos, May 1995, at 10.
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mental abuses of human rights and ameliorate the suffering of those living
in abject poverty in a world of vast economic inequality.
21
In Part One, I discuss the developing international consensus on polit-
ical participation and democratic governance that Thomas Franck identi-
fied in his seminal article, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance.
22
This emerging consensus is consistent with the beliefs that propelled the
original idea23 of a United Nations before these beliefs succumbed to the
tensions and divisions of the post-war East-West struggle. I then critique
the harrow approach to the "right to political participation" promoted by
U.N. electoral missions. The "international dimension" predicate for U.N.
electoral missions is the bedrock of this spare and somewhat cynical
approach. I argue that although the underlying rationales for the interna-
tional dimension predicate-maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity, and the promotion of equal rights and self-determination of peoples-
are important U.N. values, the promotion of a comprehensive body of fun-
damental human rights provides a more compelling justification for U.N.
involvement in the political affairs of all nations and a worthier rationale
for the organization's continued existence. A human rights promotion
rationale should justify U.N. involvement in the political affairs of
independent nations even when the U.N.'s obligation to maintain interna-
tional peace and security or to advance national self-determination is not
21. See generally UNrTE NATIONS DEvELOPMENT PROGRAmmME, HuMAN DEvELoPMENT
REPORT, 1995 (1995). One commentator comes at the same set of issues from a different
angle. He asserts that there has been a conscious reluctance by many advocates to link
human rights norms to a Western liberal democratic outcome. He describes this
"abstraction and apoliticization" of human rights as "obscur[ing] the political character
of the norms that it seeks to universalize." Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human
Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L 589 (DATE). Furthermore, he argues that the failure to make
the link "delays the reformation, reconstruction, and multiculturalization of human
rights." Id. My concern in this Article has been the failure of the U.N. to make the link
between its slimmed-down version of democracy or "electoralism" and human rights
values. Like Professor Mutua, I am concerned that a failure to make explicit linkages
avoids an honest dialogue and retards the development of a truly global vision of democ-
racy or human rights. Such a truly global vision would entail an expansion and a deep-
ening of our current understanding of democracy.
22. Franck, supra note 11. "Both textually and in practice, the international system
is moving toward a clearly designated democratic entitlement, with national governance
validated by international standards and systematic monitoring of compliance. The task
is to perfect what has been so wondrously begun." Id. at 91. Many scholars are, of
course, skeptical of such claims. Makau wa Mutua, for example, is critical of the tone of
"triumphalism," and the Western or liberal democratic biases in such claims. See
Mutua, supra note 21, at 592, n.9.
23. While maintenance of international peace and security was the core objective
behind the founding of the U.N., the drafters of the U.N. Charter recognized that attain-
ment of this objective was intimately connected to cooperation among members to solve
economic, social, and human rights concerns. Thus, these elements were explicitly
included in Charter's preamble and as part of its purposes and principles. See U.N.
CHARTER preamble & ch. I; LmLND M. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS IN A CHANGING
WORLD 11-14 (1974); LELAND M. GOODRICH Er AL., CHARTR OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DocUMENTs 34-35 (3d ed. 1969).
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directly at issue.24
In Part Two, I review legal foundations of U.N. actions in support of
free and fair elections and argue that the U.N. Charter and other major
sources of the right to political participation dearly support a human
rights promotion rationale for U.N. actions. I then propose the develop-
ment of a new U.N. policy-'democratic guardianship"25 -to generate, safe-
guard and deepen the democratic entitlement now being won by people
throughout the world. Founded upon the human rights obligations of the
U.N., a democratic guardianship policy represents a significantly
expanded U.N. role in promoting not just the right to political participa-
tion but also the broader right to democratic governance.
Part Three outlines the core elements of this proposed U.N. policy of
democratic guardianship and discusses how the policy would help expand
and deepen global understanding and reception of human rights in gen-
eral, and democracy in particular. I argue that U.N. electoral missions have
already clarified important elements of the right to political participation,
thereby weakening barriers to the advancement of international human
rights. A policy of democratic guardianship would go beyond the current
emphasis on ensuring the technical validity of elections and would take
advantage of current opportunities to secure gains in human rights that
have followed the end of the East-West struggle.26 Perhaps more impor-
24. A clear example of this would be a situation where a government represses its
own citizens but the level or quality of the repression in no way threatens international
peace and security. Under current U.N. theory and practice, the U.N. is unlikely to get
involved in such a case-unless a threat to international peace and security, or a viola-
tion of self-determination rationale could be manufactured to support U.N. intervention.
Such charades must be done away with at this point in the evolution of the U.N.; the
U.N. ought to be able to intervene in support of popular demands for democratic govern-
ance in all instances of gross human rights abuses by national governments. See infra
Parts II and IV.
25. This phrase needs some explaining. In the first place, the notion of democracy
needing a guardian seems odd. Guardianship in this context does not imply a Platonic
or Confucian conception of governance. I do not propose any regime of rule by a class
of guardians or meritorius elites outside of the democratic process. On the contrary,
"guardianship" is used in this Article to signify an additional line of defense of the demo-
cratic process. It is closely tied to my profound objection to the traditional U.N. orienta-
tion where the sovereign state is substituted in international relations, in all significant
respects, for civil society or the individual. Guardianship is a deployment of the multi-
ple interests represented by the U.N., in essence, to hold the state to the pledges it has
undertaken in terms of democratic governance and rejects an a priori denial of collective
authority to examine the relationship between the state and its various constituents. For
a distinction between democracy and classical notions of guardianship, see ROBERT A.
DAHL, DaimocRAcY AND rrs Camcs 52-64 (1989). Since the U.N. is a voluntary associa-
tion, any effort to guarantee or guard democracy could face objections either at the point
of initiation of the policy or in its implementation. However, this would be welcome;
this is the essence of democracy as dialogue. At the very least, the conversations over
such a development at this time should force governments to deal with the meanings of
diverse popular demands for U.N. involvements in national political affairs. See, e.g.,
Ibrahim J. Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: The United
Nations, NGOs, and Apartheid, 19 FoRDHam ITr'L UJ. 1464 (1996); Nigerians Protest,
supra note 1 (illustrating one example of these demands).
26. For an argument that the dominant human rights perspective being promoted at
present represents a political project to universalize Western liberal democracy, see
Vol. 30
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tantly, in responding to global dissatisfaction with its current ad hoc, reac-
tive, and constricted approach to human rights violations,27 a new U.N.
policy of democratic guardianship should also bring greater international
attention to often-neglected human rights issues such as the "critical role
"private" international actors and forces play in perpetuating human rights
abuses and inequality in many parts of the world.
28
I. Limits of Current United Nations Policy and Practice
A. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: The
International Consensus
The 1991 Paris peace accords set up a U.N. mission of unprecedented size
and authority in Cambodia, with a mandate to create a neutral political envi-
ronment in which to hold elections. Yet while human rights concerns fig-
ured prominently in the accords, the U.N. subordinated most of the human
rights agenda in a misguided rush to the ballot box.
29
Since its founding in 1945, the U.N. has helped build an international
consensus for the idea that citizens of an independent country have a right
under international law to participate in the political processes of their
country through "democratic" elections. 30 When there have been open dis-
Mutua, supra note 21, at 601-07. This Article does not reject such a perspective or con-
front the conclusion that the Western, monocultural origins of human rights discourse
would undermine its legitimacy in the non-Western context. This Article sees the dis-
course-whatever its origins or the instrumental goals of some of its advocates-as essen-
tially dynamic with varying opportunities for transforming our understanding of the
human rights corpus and, indeed, as "talking back" to those who may have once
attempted to exercise hegemonic power. This perspective is heavily influenced by my
association with human rights movements in South Africa and Haiti-societies where the
language of human rights was adopted by ordinary people in their struggles for social
change. See, e.g., Gassama, supra note 25. See also generally Karl E. Klare, Legal Theory
and Democratic Reconstruction, 25 U. BRI. CoLUM. L. REv. 69 (1995).
27. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 16, at 2.
28. "Globalization is the central political phenomenon of our day, generating new
and fundamental inequities as regions and nations compete for corporate investment,
lowering wage, environmental and human rights standards." Incorporating the World,
THE NATION, July 15/22, 1996, at 3 (this issue of The Nation was devoted to what the
editors termed, "The Corporatization of the World," and contains several provocative
articles).
For example, a multinational "private" actor, Shell Oil Company, has been criticized
generally for its activities in Nigeria, and specifically for not doing enough to stop the
executions of human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and others, and for helping to
finance the militaryjunta. SeeJohn Darnton, Shell Makes a Big Oil Discovery Off Nigeria,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at A8. Other multinational "private" actors have also periodi-
cally faced criticisms. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, In America: Terror in Toyland, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 1994, at A27; Abuse in Nike Factories in Vietnam Group, Reuters, Mar. 27, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. Herbert contends that, "The toy compa-
nies have embraced the Far East sweatshops for the same reason as other industries:
There is an enormous supply of semi-slave laborers, including legions of poor and igno-
rant women and young girls, who will work for grotesquely low wages in disgusting and
extremely dangerous conditions." Herbert, supra.
29. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 16, at 2.
30. See U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 1-3. Democracy was not a
prerequisite for U.N. membership. Delegates to the San Francisco conference rejected
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agreements among U.N. members on this topic, they have generally not
occurred because the value or efficacy of this political participation right
has been rejected. Rather, disagreements have arisen over definitions and
implementation of the right. The dispute between the United States and
Cuba over the legitimacy of the Castro regime is one case in point.31 Both
countries affirm the existence and importance of the right to political par-
ticipation, including the critical free and fair elections component.32 How-
ever, they disagree sharply over whether Cuba has provided for an
internationally acceptable implementation of the right, especially its free
and fair elections component, and the level of outside involvement that
should be allowed by the Castro government.
33
"Free and fair elections" is the formulation generally used to describe
the core element of an internationally acceptable scheme of political partic-
ipation in national governance. 34 Despite occasional interpretive differ-
ences or disputes over its implementation, a growing convergence of global
democracy as a criterion for membership and instead focused on the "peace-loving"
nature of nations desiring membership. See GOODRICH ET AL, supra note 23, at 88. The
International Bill of Rights also does not clearly endorse a particular form of democracy.
Nonetheless, U.N. membership was conditional on the applicant's acceptance, ability
and willingness to carry out the Charter's obligations which clearly include human
rights. U.N. CHARTER art. 4 (1). In the politi6al participation context, the U.N. has sup-
ported human rights guidelines and standards reflective of the aspirations of liberal
democracy without significant or concrete opposition from member states. See generally
U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTs, supra note 3. The U.N. posture on democracy could be
described as one where the organization, a product of liberal democratic impulses and
ideals, has tolerated practices among its membership that have not lived up to those
ideals and strategically justified its tolerance by references to sovereignty-based doc-
trines or the maintenance of international peace and security rationale. See Henry J.
Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARv. HuM. RTs. Y.B. 77, 85-89
(1988). U.N. electoral missions have demonstrated a clear preference for political partic-
ipation standards derived from liberal democratic beliefs. See generally U.N. CENrRE FOR
HumAN RIGHTS, supra note 3. See also Oscar M. Garibaldi, On the Ideological Content of
Human Rights Instruments: The Clause 'In a Democratic Society,' in CONTEMPORARY IssuEs
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF Louis B. SOHN 23, 68 (T. Buergenthal ed.,
1984).
31. See, e.g., Douglas Farah, Cubans to the Polls: Castro Declares 'Democracy for the
Poor' Is Reaffirmed in Choosing of City Councils, WASH. POST, July 10, 1995, at A10.
32. Id.
33. The dispute centers around whether Cuba has provided for free and fair demo-
cratic elections, or whether it even can with its single-party system. Id. "'People want us
to have elections where they spend millions of dollars, like in the United States,' Castro
said. 'You have to have a lot of money in the democracy of the rich. Who here does it for
money, when they do not even receive a salary for their work?'" Id. The Cuban Commu-
nist Party Congress has made changes in order to open up political participation, includ-
ing implementation of "direct secret ballot elections in the selection of members and
appointments to committees at all levels." CARoT T BENGELSDORF, THE PROBLEM OF
DEmocRAcY IN CUBA 170 (1994). The U.S. Perspective on free and fair elections in Cuba
is reflected in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575
(1992). Under the Act, Congress stated in § 1702(1) that, "(1) the government of Fidel
Castro has demonstrated consistent disregard for internationally accepted standards of
human rights and for democratic values." 106 Stat. at 2575. Congress stated in
§ 1703(8) that, "It should be the policy of the United States... to encourage free and
fair elections to determine Cuba's political future.. ." 106 Stat. at 2576.
34. See, e.g., U.N. CENRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTs, supra note 3, at 6-11.
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interests support the right to political participation centered around free
and fair elections.3 5 Undeniably, and perhaps understandably, there is a
parting of ways among proponents as to how far the concept extends. Cer-
tainly, for some advocates, it does not extend much beyond a narrow, for-
malistic understanding of political participation built around the ritualized
marking of an "X" in a box beside the name or symbol of a candidate of
choice without the voter being subjected to direct recriminations.3 6 While
others may desire more, many human rights activists appear to have
accepted this minimalist and rather impoverished conception of democ-
racy and have chosen to devote energy to making it real for those denied
even that much.
3 7
Proponents of the right to political participation have used the U.N. as
a central forum from which to advocate and promote the spread of this
modem entitlement 3 8 Beginning with the 1945 U.N. Charter and the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the U.N. has con-
structed a normative framework for the realization of this right.3 9 This
framework has been sustained over time by the actions of various units in
the U.N. system and the contributions of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that focus on it.40 The international collaborative effort, involving
U.N. organs, human rights workers and others, has helped satisfy, even if
only temporarily, the yearnings of millions of the world's oppressed people
for self-empowerment, liberation or even just marginally greater control
35. See Stoelting, supra note 3, at 372-73. While this convergence may represent the
consequence of Western hegemony, its motivating power among the dispossessed of the
world today cannot be exaggerated. See The Promise of Democracy, AFRcA DEmos, Mar.
1995, at 1.
36. One scholar has observed that:
[I]t is somewhat remarkable that voting, which involves little more than sticking
a pin through a piece of cardboard in secret once a year, should be regarded as
the very essence of democratic participation. Yet if we try to understand this
annual phenomenon as an expression of the group pretending to constitute
itself in the service of maintaining alienation, we can begin to make sense of it.
Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 TEx. L. Ruv. 1563, 1575 n.20 (1984).
37. See, e.g., Focus on Namibia, Africa's Last Colony, AFmucA DEmos, Mar. 1995, at 9-
11. For a brief, but focused, discussion of the competing liberal perspectives on the
requirements for establishing democracy, see Michael Bratton, Are Competitive Elections
Enough?, AFmicA DEMos, Mar. 1995, at 7-8. These perspectives are characterized by their
emphasis on process and institutionalization of machineries for the conduct of regular
"free and fair elections." I refer to these liberal perspectives as "electoralism."
38. In addition to the requests from governments and political groups for U.N.
assistance, the World Conference on Human Rights endorsed U.N. assistance for the
conduct of free and fair elections. See U.N. CENTRE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at
v. See also Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference
on Human Rights, June 25, 1993, reprinted in THE UNrED NATIONS, THE UNrrED NATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1945-1995, at 460-61, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24, U.N. Sales No.
E.95.1.21 (1995).
39. See U.N. CENTRE FOR HumAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 15-17.
40. See id. at 2-3. On the role of non-governmental organizations in monitoring the
South African elections, see THE Uurra NATIONS, THE UNI=ED NATIONS AND APARTHEID
1948-1994, at 123-24, U.N. Sales No. E.95.17 (1994).
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over their lives.
41
Unfortunately, in interpreting its responsibilities to promote political
participation, the U.N. fails to give human rights necessary priority.
Instead, the U.N. limits the scope of its responsibilities, adopting a shallow
conception of political participation that does not fully respond to the
sources of the denial of political participation and other human rights.
42
This aspect of the U.N. role in national affairs might be overlooked by
many who may assume that highly publicized U.N. electoral involvements
are driven primarily by human rights concerns.43 The fact, however, is
that the U.N. intervenes electorally only in a few cases44 even though
demand has grown 45 and the need for such involvement is considerable.
46
When it does intervene, the scope of its involvement is tragically limited.
47
In the next two sections of the Article, I identify and criticize the cur-
rent predicates for U.N. involvement in national elections of independent
countries. I also critique the values underlying these U.N. predicates,
namely self-determination and the maintenance of international peace and
security. I then go beyond this "external" critique and examine the limited
nature of electoral interventions, questioning why substantive issues of eco-
nomic and social justice, for example, have been kept to the margins in the
conduct of the U.N. missions.
B. Inadequate Conceptual Foundations: Maintaining International
Peace and Security and Promoting the Self-Determination of
Peoples
The U.N. generally limits its mandate to promote political participation in
independent nations only to those instances with (1) a "clear international
dimension"48 and (2) where "[a] formal request has been received from the
state concerned."49 The U.N. has received a significant number of requests
from governments for electoral involvement, especially since the end of the
Cold War.50 Moreover, the U.N. has been laudably flexible in finding a
"clear international dimension," intervening in the elections of countries
such as South Africa" l and Haiti.52 Nonetheless, it would be more in keep-
41. See, e.g., Howard W. French, West African Surprise: Peace Taking Root in Sierra
Leone, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1996, at Al; Gassama, supra note 25; Donatella Lorch, In the
U.S., Haitians Take Their Joy to the Streets, N.Y. TIMsS, Dec. 19, 1990, at A12.
42. Human Rights Watch has made the same points in a similar context: "Human
rights have been treated as a dispensable luxury, not as a central element in the success
of U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian operations." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
16, at 1.
43. Id.
44. See Stoelting, supra note 3, at 373.
45. See U.N. CaETrm FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at v., 2.
46. See generally 33 U.N. CHRON. (1996).
47. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS VATCH, WORLD REPORT, 1996 (1996).
48. See U.N. CENTR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 2 (citing Report of the Secre-
tary-General, A/47/668 and Corr.1, para. 53).
49. Id.
50. See U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at v., 2.
51. UNIrnD NATIONS, UNrED NATIONS AND APARTHEID, supra note 40, at 115-26.
52. See generally 33 U.N. CHRON. 4 (1996).
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ing with what Louis Henkin has called the "Age of Rights"53 to champion
the broader human rights responsibility of the organization in justifying
U.N. electoral interventions.
The current U.N. policy of predicating electoral interventions on a for-
mal governmental invitation and the finding of an international dimension
suffers from two significant weaknesses. First, the U.N. intervenes in only
a small number of countries compared to the number that seek or would
benefit from such involvement.54 Secondly, the U.N. promotes a false
image of what the development of a democratic society requires.5 ' Thus,
the U.N.'s governmental invitation and international dimension require-
ments limit the scope of the organization's human rights contributions.
These requirements maintain U.N. focus on the interests of governments,
reflecting the traditional perspective that the overriding purpose of the
U.N. is to regulate the conduct of states vis-a-vis each other rather than
promote the interests or concerns of people or communities within a
state.'
6
Two principles-the sovereignty and equality of states' 7 and the equal
53. Louis HENICIN, THE AGE OF RIGrTs (1990) (an assertive and optimistic portrayal of
the modem human rights movement). Cf. Henry J. Steiner, The Youth of Rights, 104
HRv. L. Rev. 917 (1991) (reviewing Louis Hm~acN, THE AGE OF RiGi-rrs (1990)) (a more
reserved perspective about the state or accomplishments of the movement).
54. See U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 2 (listing only eight coun-
tries receiving such assistance between 1990 and 1993). The number has increased
sharply since electoral missions were sent to Haiti (1995), Mozambique, the former
Yugoslavia, and Guatemala (1995-1996). However, this number pales in comparison to
the widespread human rights abuses recorded in U.N. member states. See generally, e.g.,
HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH, supra note 47.
55. For explorations of what a "truer" image of democracy would be like, see RADI-
c.As DmaociAcY (David Trend, ed., 1996). See, in particular, Chantal Mouffe, Radical
Democracy or Liberal Democracy?, in RArICA DmaocACY, supra, at 19; Gayatri C. Spivak
& David Plotke, A Dialogue on Democracy, in RADCnAL DamocRwcY, supra, at 209.
56. See U.N. CHARTRm art. 1, para. 1. The full text of Article 1, however, illustrates the
complex interrelationship among the various U.N. purposes. Article 1 states:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effec-
tive collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and
to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of jus-
tice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropri-
ate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 1, 7. According to Brownlie, "[t]he sovereignty and
equality of states represent the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations .... "
BROwNIE, supra note 18, at 287.
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rights and self-determination of peoplesS8-are recognized as intrinsic to
the maintenance-of-peace-and-security purpose of the U.N. However, these
principles present the U.N. with a dilemma. On the one hand, the U.N.
must limit the instances in which it challenges governmental authority
because governments have a nasty record of disrupting international peace
and security when their authority is challenged.' 9 The U.N., therefore,
seeks permission from governments before sending electoral missions to
verify whether governments have legitimate support.60 On the other hand,
because international peace has long been disrupted by people agitating for
equality and self-determination, 61 the U.N. also cannot ignore such claims.
Thus, the U.N.'s earliest involvement in elections raised the conflict
between its human rights functions, represented by support for self-deter-
mination, and its peace and security mission, represented by its respect for
sovereign equality of states.
Neither the U.N.'s responsibility to maintain international peace and
security nor the principles of sovereignty and equality of states and the
equal rights and self-determination of peoples underlying that responsibil-
ity provide a progressive basis to justify U.N. electoral missions.62 On the
contrary, these values only indirectly, if at all, help oppressed people while
providing a legitimating gloss to their governments. 63 They severely limit
58. See U.N. CuRan art. 1, para. 2. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 593-96.
59. See Thomas Friedman, U.N. Human Rights Resolution, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 27, 1995,
at A15. Friedman describes the difficulties encountered by the U.S. as it tried to gain
support at the U.N. for punitive actions against Nigeria in the aftermath of Ken Saro-
Wina's execution. Id. Two of the primary opponents were China and Indonesia, both
powerful countries whose treatment of minority and dissident groups has been chal-
lenged at the U.N. Id. Governments like Iraq and Libya have responded even more
forcefully to such challenges. See, e.g., R.W. Apple, Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its
Oil: U.S. Condemns Attack, Urges United Action, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al; William
MacLean, Kuwaitis Insecure Despite Border Demarcation, Reuters, May 23, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
60. See U.N. CENrE FOR HUMAN RIGHTs, supra note 3, at 2.
61. The American Revolution may be seen as an early example of a paradigmatic
self-determination claim. See BERNAR DONOUGHUE, BRITISH PoLrrics AND THE AMERICAN
REvOLUTION 1-21 (1964). The Irish Republican Army has long used violent means to
pursue its self-determination claim. For a criticism of these tactics, see Negotiation or
Other Peaceful Means Must Be Used to Settle Disputes, IusH TimES, Jan. 21, 1994, at 8
(edited version of address given by the Taoiseach, Mr. Reynolds, in Barberstown Castle,
Jan. 20, 1994). Self-determination claims by minority populations in various countries
have become even more prevalent and increasingly violent since the end of the Cold
War. See George D. Moffett III, Struggles Grow for 'Self-Determination', CHIsmN Sci.
MoNrroR, Oct. 21, 1992, at 1; Michael Reisman, My Self-Determination, Your Extinction,
L.A. Tamrs, Aug. 12, 1992, at B7.
62. By "progressive" in this context, I mean primarily doing something that helps to
open up choices and lift burdens on the oppressed who solicit U.N. or other outside
assistance.
63. International law scholars generally are not very critical of the international
peace and security and self-determination rationales underlying U.N. electoral involve-
ments. Some of these scholars, perhaps sensitive to the criticism that the U.N. has
stretched the international peace and security aspect beyond reasonable credibility, have
emphasized the self-determination prong to justify this intrusive international role in
domestic political processes. Thomas M. Franck, for example, considers self-determina-
tion to be "the oldest aspect of the democratic entitlement." See Franck, supra note 11, at
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U.N. electoral missions to a small number of cases, ignoring many other
serious situations that cry out for U.N. involvement.64 The search or wait
for an "international dimension" or a formal request from a government is,
after fifty years of the U.N., unseemly, sometimes disingenuous and ulti-
mately damaging to the U.N.'s efforts to promote human rights.65 Further-
more, as I argue below, reliance on the self-determination principle is
unwise in light of the increasingly discredited nature of this principle.
66
The other significant weakness of the U.N. electoral intervention is
that they have encouraged a superficial conception of democracy by their
emphasis on the ritualistic aspects of elections.67 To promote lasting
democracies would require, among other things, confronting the gross eco-
nomic disparities within and among members.68 This is not to suggest
that the U.N. can substitute for domestic politics. However, there are some
52. When contrasted with the plain international peace and security rationale, an
emphasis on "self-determination of peoples" seems to provide the better intellectual
rationale for U.N. intervention in the domestic political processes of independent
nations. Neither the maintenance of international peace and security nor the self-deter-
mination rationale, however, satisfactorily explain the need, indeed the global impera-
tive, that must now propel U.N. and other international efforts to advance political
participation and other human rights in all national settings.
64. See generally HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47.
65. Such a search or wait is unseemly because, as in Haiti in 1990, people died while
the Security Council disputed over the presence of an international dimension. See
Keith Richburg, U.N. Envoy for Somalia Resigns Post, Blames Bureaucracy, WASH. POST,
Oct. 30, 1992, at A31. It is sometimes disingenuous as exemplified by the U.N.'s actions
in Somalia in 1992 when it accepted an invitation from a phantom government to inter-
vene. See S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (Jan.
23, 192). By the time this resolution was adopted by the Security Council, after the
request by Somalia, the nation had ceased to exist as an entity for all practical purposes.
See Ibrahim J. Gassama, World Order in the Post-Cold War Era: The Relevance and Role of
the United Nations After Fifty Years, 20 BRooK. J. INT'L L 256, 285-92 (1994). Ultimately
the search or wait for an international dimension can be damaging to the U.N.'s human
rights obligations because in most cases such U.N. machinations lead to harsh criticism
of the organization. See Richburg, supra (for harsh criticism by former U.N. Somalia
envoy Mohammed Sahnoun).
66. See infra Part I.B.2. I argue that the principle carries too much baggage to serve
as a progressive vehicle for human rights. I make this claim even though international
law scholars consider the general principle of self-determination to be "a peremptory
norm of international law (jus cogens) within the meaning of Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties." Antonio Cassese, The Self-Determination of Peoples,
in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 92, 111 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). A U.N. role for
elections monitoring or other intervention in support of political participation in
independent countries can hardly be built on an interpretation of the self-determination
guarantees expressed in the U.N. Charter. See Stoelting, supra note 3, at 411. However,
when the U.N. Charter guarantee is read together with the more expanded guarantees in
the Political Covenant, such a role can be supported. See Cassese, supra, at 92-113. See
also Daniel Thfirer, Self Determination, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
470, 470-75 (1985); WESTON E r AL., supra note 19, at 177, 201-09.
67. U.N. CENTRE FoR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 15-17.
68. See WORLD BANK, PovERTY REDUCTION AND THE WORLD BANK PROGR.ESS AND
CHALLENGES IN THE 1990s (1996). "In 1993, an estimated 1.3 billion people in the devel-
oping world still lived on less than one dollar a day. Over the past 30 years, incomes in
the countries with the richest 20 percent of the world's population grew nearly three
times faster than in those countries with the poorest 20 percent." Id. at 2. According to
the report, the number of people living on less than one dollar a day rose from 1.23
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roles that the U.N. is well positioned to play in promoting human rights.
For example, the U.N., acting as part of a broader democratic involvement,
could address the role that multinational agencies and corporations play in
fostering human rights abuses. 69 Free and fair elections promoted by U.N.
electoral missions, by themselves, will not sustain democracy in economi-
cally desperate societies. On the contrary, they create false hope among
people about the likelihood of a change in their circumstances, and ulti-
mately may produce disillusionment and cynicism as bright promises of
fundamental change remain unfulfilled.
Before proceeding to make the case for an expanded and more tex-
tured U.N. policy of "democratic guardianship," I will elaborate on some of
the problems associated with the maintenance of international peace and
security, and the equal rights and self-determination rationales underpin-
ning current U.N. policy.
1. Maintaining International Peace and Security
Maintaining international peace and security is of paramount importance
to the United Nations. The U.N. Charter gives the Security Council broad
powers to determine when peace is threatened or breached.70 Yet, the
focus on international peace and security limits the ambit of Security
Council concern, providing an excuse for non-action in the face of human
rights violations. This limited ambit of concern is not necessarily co-exten-
sive with that implied in the U.N.'s simultaneous responsibility to promote
human rights. And, attempting to bind U.N. human rights responsibilities
to the maintenance of international peace and security, rather than con-
sider the human rights concern as an autonomous responsibility, eventu-
ally leads to the dead-end of unpersuasive rationalizations and illegitimacy
for action.71 This is particularly true in the post-Cold War world. Many
conflicts implicating serious human rights concerns are reasonably con-
tained within national borders and their direct impact on international
peace and security are often difficult to articulate. 72 The U.N. is caught on
the horns of an awful dilemma. On the one hand, the concept of a threat
to, or a breach of, international peace and security would lose all intellec-
billion in 1987 to in 1993. Id. at 4-5. See also Twenty Percent of World's People Live on
Dollar a Day, Reuters, June 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File.
69. See Darton, supra note 28; Incorporating the World, supra note 28.
70. U.N. CHaRaE art. 39.
71. For example, even after Haiti's provisional president Trouillot requested U.N.
monitoring of the country's first democratic election in 1990, the U.N. Security Council
had considerable difficulty reaching a consensus because many members were afraid to
set a "precedent for [U.N.] involvement in domestic situations." See U.N. Postpones Con-
sideration of Assistance to Haiti's Election, Xn,-MuA NEws AGENcY, July 20, 1990, available
in LEXIS, News Library.
72. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the civil conflict in Somalia that led to famine
and mass starvation in 1990-92, and the ongoing brutal civil struggle in Liberia are
examples of these types of conflicts. See, e.g., Gassama, supra note 65, at 285-96; How-
ard W. French, As War Factions Shatter, Liberia Falls into Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
1994, at 4; Rwanda Says Army Killed 300 Hutu in 2-Day Raid, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1995, at
A9.
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tual or operational power if it is relied upon to justify every instance where
the U.N. acts in support of oppressed people. 73 If, on the other hand, the
U.N. adopts an intellectually and operationally justifiable (but too narrow)
interpretation of the concept, it risks losing legitimacy in the eyes of people
whose requests for help would be rejected as a result. It is time to recog-
nize that the U.N. must, on some occasions, act in support of human rights
where no reasonable threat to, or breach of, international peace and secur-
ity can be invented. The U.N. Charter obviously anticipates such situa-
tions by specifically constraining the use of coercive measures by the
organization while allowing for a more gradual development of human
rights promotion norms. 74 The principal effect of associating political par-
ticipation rights with the maintenance of international peace and security
has been to constrain, rather than enhance, the U.N. role in developing
progressive human rights norms.
2. Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples
The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples is increas-
ingly discredited in a post-Cold War world confronted with seemingly end-
less and unresolvable claims for self-determination. Bitter conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia, many parts of Africa, and the former Soviet Union have
clouded once benign receptions of such claims. 75 Self-determination
claims also are increasingly incongruous in a world where technology and,
in many instances, economic interests are bringing many people closer
together in a manner that devalues or transforms the coherence of national
boundaries.76
73. This concern arose when the U.N. Security Council considered a U.N. mission
to Haiti's 1990 election. See U.N. Postpones Consideration, supra note 71 (reporting the
concern of member States that acting in Haiti would set a precedent for a more expan-
sive U.N. role). See also Stoelting, supra note 3, at 381-83.
74. This contrast is readily noted when the language of Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter dealing with the use of coercion to deal with international security matters is
contrasted with that of Chapters IX and X dealing with human rights and humanitarian
matters. See U.N. CaRTER arts. VII, IX, X.
75. See The Birth of New Nations, BosTON GLOBE, July 5, 1995, at 14; Moffett, supra
note 61; Reisman, supra note 61; Self-Determination and Chaos, JERusALEm Posr, Mar. 18,
1991, at 4. See also Clyde H. Farnsworth, Quebec's Premier Quits After Loss on Indepen-
dence, N.Y. TImEs, Nov. 1, 1995, at Al.
76. Some examples of this convergence include: (1) As trade increases between Rus-
sia and the United States, many Alaskan stores are stocking 220-volt appliances for visit-
ing Russian tourists. James Brooke, As Trade Booms, Little Fear of a Communist, N.Y.
TImEs, June 10, 1996, at Al; and (2) A Zambian doctor can now have access to the latest
medical diagnostic and treatment information via the intemet. Drusilla Menaker, Africa
Yearns to Go On-Line, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 31, 1995, at A12. However, as Menaker also
notes, only twelve African countries offer direct access to the intemet. Id. See also Rose-
maryJ. Coombe, Left Out on the Information Highway, 75 OR. L. REv. 237 (1996). "The
global is hardly planetary; some areas are simply spanned, others escape the net
entirely. Major parts of Africa, for example, face increasing marginalization and impov-
erishment." Id. at 244. See generally Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. Rev. 1293 (1996). "The
world is increasingly connected, but it is also increasingly full of difference. We need
representational vehicles that enable us to remain sensitive to diversities of meaning
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Historically, the equal rights and self-determination of peoples princi-
ple focused on the struggles of colonized or minority groups to liberate
themselves from imperial or other external threats to their collective
rights.77 However, most human rights advocates promoting political par-
ticipation rights are more concerned today with the immediate intra-
national threats posed by ruthless national governments-without distinc-
tions of race, ethnicity, gender, or national origin-to their citizens, than by
relatively less direct threats from external sources. 78 The fact that the self-
determination principle in its fullest sense encompasses both "internal self-
determination" 79 as well as "external self-determination" 80 does not
address the inadequacy of the principle as a core rationale for U.N. electo-
ral missions. 8 While the "internal" aspect of the self-determination princi-
ple in theory supports international actions promoting domestic political
participation rights, the popular history and general understanding of the
self-determination principle limit its utility in the intra-national or domes-
tic context. 82 Self-determination as a basis for action against domestic or
even as we acknowledge the shaping power of processes that at first seem monolithic,
homogenizing, and all-encompassing." Id. at 1353.
77. See The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR Comm. Sess. Supp. No 21, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960). See also Richard F. Iglar, The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the Interna-
tional Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia's and Croatia's Right to Secede, 15 B.C. Irr'L &
CoNiP. L. REv. 213 (1992).
78. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT, 1994
(1993); AmNsr'Y INTERNATIONAL, THE 1994 REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE
WORLD (1994). This point is made not to deny the indirect and sometimes dominant
role of external or multinational forces in human rights violations. Many Third World
dictators need foreign investment and trade to provide the means of obtaining instru-
ments of repression and to maintain their corrupt lifestyles. Zaire, for example, has long
been governed by a series of bribe-taking military commanders and governors. See How-
ard W. French, Zaire Struggles to Keep Neglected Region in Fold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
1996, at A12. In fact, the dependence of corrupt Third World elites on access to the
products and services of the developed world has been too long ignored in discussions
of human rights violations in these societies. The United States, for example, is the
fourth largest investor in Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, and has only recently
enacted legislation to deal economically with gross and persistent human rights viola-
tions by the Burmese military. Other nations, including Japan and Great Britain, are
considering similar sanctions. See Steven Erlanger, U.S. Weighs Tougher Reaction to Bur-
mese Crackdown, N.Y. Tvims, Oct. 5, 1996, at A4; Editorial, Responding to Burmese Repres-
sion, N.Y. Trams, Oct. 5, 1996, at A22.
79. Internal self-determination may be defined as "the right [of the people of a coun-
try] to choose their form of government and to determine the social, economic, and
cultural policies of the state." Cassese, supra note 66, at 97.
80. External self-determination includes the right of a people "freely [to] decide on
their international status, whether to form a new state or to associate themselves with an
existing state" and "the right of the people of a sovereign state to be free from foreign
interference which affects the international status of that state, as well as from any form
of encroachment upon its independence." Id. at 98, 100.
81. Id. at 96-102.
82. Cassese argues that Article I of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) confirms the internal aspects of self-determination by affirming the right
of people to "'freely determine their political status.. .'" See id. at 96-97 (quoting art. 1
of the ICCPR). Cassese, however, concedes that subsequent U.N. practice had shown a
tendency toward a constricted interpretation of the principle as Third World and Social-
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intra-group threats to individual rights has not achieved the same level of
international consensus as self-determination for protection from external
domination.8
3
Undeniably, inclusion of the self-determination principle in the U.N.
Charter was aimed specifically at addressing the status of people in colo-
nial territories on the verge of independence.84 This is evident from the
pre-Charter aims of self-determination proponents like President Woodrow
Wilson, who championed the freedom and independence demands of
many of Europe's minorities after the First World War.85 Wilson's primary
motivation for promoting such demands was his conviction that a Europe
of free and democratic nations would be more stable and peaceful than
one with many oppressed minorities agitating for freedom.86 This motiva-
tion, however, does not obscure the secondary place of the internal aspects
of self-determination in the calculation of Wilson and other historical advo-
cates of the principle.
The essence of the self-determination principle, as originally under-
stood, was "the extension of the principles of nineteenth-century European
nationalism to the rest of the world."87 Freeing one set of distinctive peo-
ple from any sort of forced association with another was a central goal.88
Every recognized "people" had the right to statehood, barring other more
important policy complications such as the imperial state possessing
nuclear weapons or being in alliance with major world powers.89 Clearly,
ist nations attempted to limit internal self-determination "to the people of a sovereign
country whose government pursues a policy of systematic discrimination based on race,
creed, or color." Id. at 109. Cassese concludes, however, that while subsequent develop-
ments should inform, they could not detract from obligations under the Covenant. Id. at
110. Nevertheless, the reluctance of many U.N. members to support a general policy of
election monitoring in independent nations reflects strong adherence to the narrow view
of self-determination. See generally G.A. Res. 48/124, supra note 2. See also Melinda N.
Hodgson, When to Accept, When to Abstain: A Framework for U.N. Election Monitoring,
25 N.Y.U. J. IN'r'TL L. & POL 137, 151 (1992).
83. See Cassese, supra note 66, at 109 (distinguishing Third World and socialist per-
spectives from Western ones).
84. Fox, supra note 8, at 573.
85. Seven of Wilson's famous fourteen points stated in hisJanuary 8, 1918 speech to
Congress dealt with the self-determination of European peoples. The other seven points
also certainly support the concept of self-determination, including the establishment of
a League of Nations "to protect great and small states alike." ARTmuR S. LiNK, WOODROW
WILSON: REvOLUTION, WAR, AND PEACE 82-83 (1979).
86. DANIEL PATRICK MoYNrmAN, ON THE LAw oF NATIONS 53-54, 102 (1990).
87. Id. at 103.
88. See Nathaniel Berman, 'But the Alternative is Despair'. European Nationalism and
the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HAuv. L. REv. 1792, 1802 (1993). "Wil-
son's program for the postwar world depended on the assumption that the principle of
nationalities could replace decadent, violent power-politics with simple, pacific, and
rational first principles." Id.
89. Such was the case with the Soviet Union before its dissolution for reasons that
were only tangentially related to self-determination. See generally FRED CoLE AN, THE
DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SovIEr (1996); MICHAL DOBBS, DowN wn-H BIG BROTHER-THE
FALL OF THE Soviur EMPmE (1997). China has successfully avoided any U.N. focus on
the self-determination of Tibetans. See AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 78, at 98-99,
143-44. NATO member Turkey has also successfully frustrated the self-determination
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self-determination's external aspects were given primacy over its internal
aspects.90
In short, self-determination's external aspects quickly swallowed up
the whole principle. Today, one finds references to internal aspects of self-
determination mainly in the writings of international law scholars. 91 Even
these scholars concede that the results of post-U.N. charter self-determina-
tion efforts have been rarely consistent with the notion of internal self-
determination. As one observer lamented in 1990, "Independence has not
always meant democracy. Of the ninety-eight nations that have come into
being since the Second World War, only some twenty-six are reckoned to
be 'free' in the Freedom House annual survey for 1988-89."92
The sad reality is that many independent nation states arising out of
the self-determination efforts of the post-WWII era came under the control
of oppressive national regimes.93 These regimes used the concept of self-
determination mainly as a mantra intoned to defend against outside inter-
ference seeking to address their misconduct of national affairs and abuse
of their people.
94
aspirations of the Kurds. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47, at 23943. Palestini-
ans, however, are moving successfully toward self-determination even without the aid of
the Soviet Union which was one of their major supporters. Id. See also MoYNI AN, supra
note 86, at 158 (noting that there were 171 nations and some 6,170 languages and
wondering whether there would be 6,170 nations in the future).
90. Cassese argues that "external self-determination is a necessary precondition for
the enjoyment of individual rights. Individuals can enjoy civil and political rights only if
the community of which they are members is not oppressed by a foreign power." Cas-
sese, supra note 66, at 101. Unfortunately, the international community, including the
U.N., until recently ignored the evisceration of the internal dimensions of self-determina-
tion in countries that have been "freed" from external oppression. See generally HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 16. Moreover, the problematic nature of separating "external"
from "internal" oppression has been apparent for some time now. For example, Shell's
role in Nigeria, where it provides critical foreign exchange for the brutal military dicta-
torship, exemplifies the blurring of the internal-external as well as the public-private
dichotomies. See Paul Lewis, After Nigeria Reprises, Shell Defends Its Record, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 1996, at Al.
91. In addition to Cassese and Franck, see, e.g., Paul H. Brietzke, Self-Determination,
or Jurisprudential Confusion: Exacerbating Political Conflict, 14 Wis. INT'L LJ. 69 (1995);
Ruth L. Gana, Which 'Self?': Race and Gender in the Right to Self-Determination as a
Prerequisite to the Right to Development, 14 Wis. INT'L LJ. 133 (1995); Feisal Hussain
Naqvi, People's Rights or Victim's Rights: Reexamining the Conceptualization of Indigenous
Rights in International Law, 71 hN. LJ. 673 (1996).
92. MOYNIHAN, supra note 86, at 105.
93. See, e.g., DANIEL CHIROT, MODERN TYRANTS: THE POWER AND PREVALENCE OF EVIL
IN OUR AGE (1994); BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF
THE NATIoN-STATE (1992); Paul Lewis, U.N. Cites 22 Nations For Rights Abuses, N.Y.
TimEs, Mar. 6, 1992, at A3 (among those singled out for criticism or increased scrutiny
by the U.N. Human Rights Commission were Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Burma,
Cuba, Haiti, and the Sudan). It cannot be over-emphasized that many of these so-called
independent nations were locked in a corrupt, vicious, inequality-enhancing interna-
tional culture from birth. See generally Davidson, supra; GRAHAm HANcocK, LORDS OF
POVERTY (1989). The domestic elites who have managed these "independent" states have
been facilitated in their enterprises by a willing international system-whether as part of
an East-West struggle or by the growth of an international trading system.
94. As Donnelly puts it, "while recognizing the legitimate claims of self-determina-
tion and cultural relativism, we must be alert to cynical manipulations of a dying, lost,
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In fact, consistent with this perspective, a Third World and socialist-
dominated U.N. General Assembly narrowly construed the self-determina-
tion principle in several key international legal documents of the 1960s
and 1970s to exclude international scrutiny of cases where political rights
were denied to citizens of these societies.95 The worst governmental
human rights offenders were often the most vocal advocates of the princi-
ple of self-determination: the USSR, the Peoples Republic of China, Iraq,
Syria, Mexico, and virtually all the newly independent African countries.
96
By and large, the international community acquiesced as the principle was
perverted.97 Given the principle's discredited past, chaotic present, and
uninspiring future, it would be more rewarding to develop and advance
other justifications for U.N. promotion of political participation.
The U.N. should free itself from the international dimension of con-
straints when it considers engaging in electoral or other pro-democratic
efforts in national affairs. An unadorned human rights justification should
forthrightly and unapologetically be advanced by the U.N. to support these
missions.98 For constitutional and political support, the U.N. could draw
on its human rights responsibilities, rooted in its Charter and the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights, as well as the incessant demands of ordinary people
for U.N. involvement.99 U.N. members have voluntarily signed on to these
or even mythical cultural past. We must not be misled by complaints . . . made by
repressive regimes." JACK DoNNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACnCE
119 (1989). See also, e.g., Donald G. McNeil Jr., Zimbabwe's Leader Scoffs at Critics of
Iron Rule, N.Y. TImEs, Apr. 27, 1996, at A3 (President Mugabe admitted the country had
a multi-party democracy only because of pressure from Western nations, claiming that
national unity was a higher priority for a developing society.); Nigeria Ruler Accuses West
Of Smears, N.Y. Timas, Nov. 18, 1995, at A4 (On the second anniversary of his seizure of
power, and a week after executing nine human rights activists, General Abacha called on
his people to interpret a "smear campaign" waged by the West as a national challenge.).
95. See Cassese, supra note 66, at 108-11; Antonio Cassese, the General Assembly in
Historical Perspective, 1945-1989, in THE UNrr= NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 40-46
(Philip Alston ed., 1992).
96. Cassese, supra note 66, at 93-95, 112-13.
97. See Cassese, supra note 95, at 51-53; HEmuN, supra note 53, at 22, 24.
98. Henkin argues that "the [U.N.'s] obligation not to intervene applies only to mat-
ters within a state's domestic jurisdiction. By virtue of the U.N. Charter and its after-
math.., human rights are not a matter of domestic jurisdiction and concern with them
cannot be intervention or other impermissible interference." HErNUN, supra note 53, at
62-65.
99. While several of these recent U.N. General Assembly pronouncements on the
issue indicate that the U.N. is in an uncertain period, searching for an international
consensus could either foster or delay an expansion of U.N. efforts to support free and
fair elections. See Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elec-
tions, G.A. Res. 137, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/137 (1992); Enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections, G.A. Res. 131, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess. U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/131 (1994). While several recent General
Assembly resolutions have commended the electoral assistance provided to member
states, they have also expressed considerable distrust of an unconstrained U.N. or other
international body playing a role in this area. G.A. Res. 137, supra; G.A. Res. 131, supra;
Report for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs
of States in their electoral processes, G.A. Res. 124, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
RES/48/124 (1994). In fact, these resolutions have sought to strengthen the domestic
jurisdiction/sovereigny barrier to U.N. action-outside of the historic decolonization
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human rights documents and no credible authority has ever questioned the
authenticity of popular demands for U.N. involvement in national political
affairs up to this point.100 Whether a broader or deeper involvement
would generate popular opposition remains to be seen. However, my
objection to the current U.N. predicates for involvement does not translate
necessarily into support for greater U.N. involvement in national politics
absent popular demand.
I also advance these arguments with full recognition that the govern-
ments that control the U.N. generally have little interest in making signifi-
cant changes to a present system which prioritizes governmental interests
over those of their people. A recent U.N. General Assembly resolution con-
firms this point by asserting that:
[T]here is no universal need for the United Nations to provide electoral
assistance to Member States, except in special circumstances such as cases
of decolonization, in the context of regional or international peace processes
or at the request of specific sovereign States, by virtue of resolutions adopted
by the Security Council or the General Assembly in each case, in strict con-
formity with the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the inter-
nal affairs of States .... 101
This position hardly promotes human rights interests. Rather, it perni-
ciously reifies the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal
affairs, valorizing the interests of the state at the expense of the people, and
thereby tragically ignoring the predominate role of governments in the
denial of fundamental human rights to their own citizens. In truth, the
resolution was an effort to preserve human rights promotion as an ad hoc
U.N. enterprise and to limit collective responsibility for the protection of
fundamental human rights for the whole of humanity.
10 2
An express U.N. responsibility, unmediated by notions of state sover-
eignty or self-determination, to intervene in support of human rights
through involvement in national elections, should not be automatically
filtered through concerns about violations of national sovereignty or con-
flicts with the primary responsibilities of national governments to protect
human rights. While national governments ought to retain primary
process or maintenance of international peace and security rationale-even as they reaf-
firm abstract guarantees of international political participation. G.A. Res. 137, supra;
G.A. Res. 131, supra. See also G.A. Res. 124, supra. While these resolutions do not per se
have binding force under international law, they are strong evidence of the perspectives
of many U.N. members.
100. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, The U.N. Is Showing Promise as Poll Watchers for the World,
N.Y. TMEs, May 30, 1993, at D5.
101. G.A. Res. 124, supra note 99 (respecting the principles of national sovereignty
and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes). This
resolution was passed with overwhelming support from Third World States while most
developed countries voted against it. U.N. DEPT. oF PUBUCAnONS, 47 YEARBOOK OF THE
UN-rm NATIONS, 1993, at 919, para. 4.
102. A major and undoubtedly valid concern of the supporters of the resolution was
foreign financing or covert support of some political groups. However, the resolution
was tragically insensitive to the history of internal threats to human rights, including
democratic governance.
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responsibility for ensuring their citizens' human rights, the human rights
responsibilities of the global collective cannot depend on requests from
national governments or other discredited predicates. The U.N. charter,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights signify a global consensus that a collec-
tive responsibility for human rights exists, and democracy clearly has
become one of the fundamental rights demanded by people.10 3 Of course,
this point does not address the paradoxical question of how an organiza-
tion composed of governments can act effectively against human rights vio-
lations if governments are a major source or party to such violations. In
part three, I will develop the arguments on how the U.N. could do more
than the sum of its parts.
C. Form Over Substance: Promoting an Impoverished Version of
Democracy
[W]e cannot be unmindful of the fact that, while democracy is a necessary
condition for the recognition of basic human fights, it is not in itself suffi-
cient to ensure the actual enjoyment of those rights. Indeed, genuine polit-
ical democracy has little chance to survive, and stability is bound to prove
elusive, without social justice. Such justice to be consolidated needs the
help of those who can rightly encourage it, though too often, they abandon it
just after it has been brought about.10 4
Not only has an inadequate conceptual foundation for the U.N. electo-
ral missions limited the instances where the U.N. can intervene in support
of political participation rights, the U.N. has also generally promoted an
impoverished understanding of democracy through its electoral missions.
Generally, U.N. electoral missions have been narrowly oriented towards
"electoralism" or monitoring and providing technical support for the polit-
ical campaigns, balloting and vote counting.' 05 Traditionally, the U.N.
arrives late in the evolution of an already extant political crisis.' 0 6 U.N.
intervention focuses on the mechanics of legitimizing political power, and
103. As Henkin notes, "International human rights agreements ... creat[e] interna-
tional responsibility for their violation." HENICN, supra note 53, at 59. See also Lois E.
Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The Emerging
Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DuKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 329
(1995); Fox, supra note 8; Franck, supra note 11. The consent theory of international
obligation offered here could, of course, be undermined where it can be shown that
there were very different understandings of the commitments embodied in these instru-
ments or where it can be argued that the consent was obtained improperly. See, e.g.,
Mutua, supra note 21, at 638-40.
104. Statement of the Secretary-General at the Paris meeting of the Conference on Secur-
ity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Press Release SG/SM/1155 (Nov. 19, 1990),
quoted in U.N. CENi FOR HUMAN RIGHrs, supra note 3, at 1.
105. See Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections,
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 97(b), U.N. Doc. A/
47/668 (1992).
106. In Burundi, where 150,000 have died in conflicts since 1993, for example, the
United Nations has yet to take concrete action. See Burundi at the Edge, N.Y. TimEs, July
25, 1996, at A22. Nor has the organization formulated a clear position on Nigeria as the
largest African nation slides toward disaster. See Friedman, supra note 59.
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departs hurriedly, sometimes shortly after television cameras have duly
recorded people lined up at the polls, and often before the establishment of
even a rudimentary governmental framework°10 7 Surely, promoting demo-
cratic governance must mean more than an ad hoc, brief incursion into the
political life of a country, or seeing a country through its first taste of the
ritual of free and fair elections.
If human rights, including the right to political participation, are to be
secured from widespread disparagement and denial, the U.N. must pro-
mote a conception of democracy that nurtures and protects human rights
in all societies. To do so, the U.N. must develop and advance a comprehen-
sive program complementing and enriching the guarantees in the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights.108 This program should self-consciously embrace and
proceed from a liberal democratic framework. 10 9 While there are many
voices raising important questions about liberal democracy and diverse
attempts to deepen or radicalize it,110 the international consensus on its
107. For example, the Haitian military seized power in 1991, deposing President Aris-
tide only seven months after the U.N. monitored their election. See Haiti's Military
Assumes Power After Troops Arrest the President, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 1, 1991, at Al. See also
U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3011th meg., at 1-10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3011, (1991) (Speech of
Jean-Bertrand Aristide appealing for international help to restore his government to
office).
108. My concept of a deepened form of democracy borrows considerably from the
radical democratic project advocated by Chantal Mouffe, Emesto Laclau and others. See
generally ERN.sro LACLAU & CHrAA. MouFa, HEGEMONY AND SocIA I.sT STRATEGY:
TowARDS A RADICAL DEmocRAnc PoLrrlcs (1985); Mouffe, supra note 55.
109. As Trend points out, the "very idea of a single democracy is a fallacy. Instead
democracy serves as a marker for a wide variety of interests, philosophies, [and] political
programs ...." David Trend, Democracy's Crisis c.-' Meaning, in RADicAL DIEMocRACY,
supra note 55, at 7, 8. Steiner made a similar observation regarding the reception of
democracy at the time the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) was adopted. Steiner, supra note 30, at 89. Nonetheless, liberal democracy
forms the standard from which various perpectives of democracy have found their iden-
tities. Mouffe, supra note 55, at 19-25. Clearly, the idea of democracy that pressed the
U.N. into electoral support services is founded upon liberal democracy, emphasizing the
"autonomous individual, capable of free choice and motivated by self-interest." Trend,
supra, at 11; Mutua, supra note 21, at 629-33. Both this emphasis and the corresponding
belief that mutual cooperation enhances the individual interest are critical to the pro-
posed U.N. human rights project as a means of helping to reduce state domination over
individuals. However, certain aspects of liberal democracy should be challenged as part
of a program of deepening democracy. For example, the separation of an individualist
private sphere from a communitarian public sphere, with the state as a neutral party,
has been central to liberal democracy's failure to deal with economic inequality and the
exclusion of "others" in society. Trend, supra, at 11. The U.N. program must deal with
the need to fully democratize the "domestic" as well as "international" private spheres.
As Mouffe points out, the embrace of liberal democracy-political liberalism-does not
mean endorsement of economic liberalism. Mouffe, supra note 55, at 20.
110. As an example of a post-colonial critique of liberal democracy and its variants,
including radical democracy, see Amarpal K Dhaliwal, Can the Subaltern Vote?: Radical
Democracy, Discourses of Representation and Rights, and Questions of Race, in RADIcAL
DEmOCRACY, supra note 55, at 42-61. Dhaliwal argues that democracy is a construct of
modernity that posseses, among other flaws, "complicit[y] with colonial discourses in
that its idealized representations are used to argue the superiority of the West." Id. at
43.
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basic outlines is undeniable."' As one scholar puts it, "the ubiquity of
democracy can become a way of envisioning global political relations-not
merely within nations, but among them as well. This concept of a global
democracy becomes especially important in light of the growing concentra-
tion of economic relations across sovereign borders." 1 2 In the long run, a
comprehensive U.N. program may obviate or reduce the need for episodic,
often controversial electoral involvements, or more drastic actions "to
restore democracy," such as the Security Council-authorized United States
military intervention in Haiti." 3
The problem actually, as the quote from the U.N. Secretary-General
makes clear, is not a failure to recognize the need for such efforts.
1" 4
Rather, the problem facing the U.N. arises from the clash between the
requirements of a serious program for democratic change and the interests
of governments and other powerful international actors that profit from a
status quo premised on deep and structural political and economic inequi-
ties within and between nations. U.N. attempts to reconcile these conflicts
between members leave it lacking the leadership to more foreward. Con-
cepts such as the sovereignty and equality of states largely sustain these
inequities in national and international relations. 115 They allow wealthy
nations (and institutions reflecting the priorities of these nations) to dis-
place responsibility for the conditions in poor nations to their sovereign
governments."16 In turn, these governments, run by alienated and rapa-
cious domestic elites and underwritten by doctrines like sovereignty, gain
111. Even skeptical leftist observers like Trend concede that "the proliferation of dem-
ocratic societies around the globe is abundantly evident." Trend, supra note 109, at 16.
As I argue, the liberal democratic impulse has dominated the United Nations from its
inception. Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR arguably
reflect liberal democratic priorities. See Steiner, supra note 30, at 85-89 (distinguishing
between the Declaration, drafted when Western nations dominated the U.N., and the
Political Covenant, which came into force when the U.N. diversified). The global trend is
clearly in the direction of societies grounded in the liberal democratic tradition. How-
ever, unless some of the deficiencies of liberal democracy are confronted, this trend will
not last. A deepened conception of democracy will remedy some of these deficiencies.
See generally Mouffe, supra note 55.
112. Trend, supra note 109, at 16. Trend makes this point while acknowledging, as I
do, that democracy is sometimes "deployed to mask foreign intervention and
neocolonial expansionism." Id.
113. See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994). See also
Foreign Press Center: Background Briefing on Haiti, Fed. News Serv., Sept. 14, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File; Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Offering Haitian Leaders
Chance to Leave, N.Y. TrEs, Sept. 15, 1994, at Al.
114. See Statement of the Secretary General, supra note 104.
115. Anthony Anghie, for example, has traced the origin of the concept of sovereignty
to the colonial encounter between the Spanish and the Indians of the western hemi-
sphere. Anthony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International
Law, 5 Soc. & LEGAL Srtums 321 (1996). In doing so, he demonstrated the malleability
of the concept and its role injustifying the subjugation of native communities. His work
points to the difficulty of employing "universal" concepts such as sovereignty in the
pursuit of the interests and aspirations of the developing countries. Id.
116. For example, the U.S. hastily retreated from its initial insistence on sanctions
against the Nigerian government stemming from the the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa;
instead, the U.S. sent an envoy to "explore the possibility of diplomatic discussions on
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substantial freedom from meaningful international sanctions, which
enables them to mismanage and exploit national resources and repress
their people. 117 All this can be accomplished without a shadow of external
intervention as long as the interests of wealthy nations are not endangered.
However, concepts like sovereignty and equality of states have historically
offered little protection to less developed nations when important interests
of wealthy nations are at stake. 118
Other prime beneficiaries of the present international political and
economic structure include powerful "private" multinational interests,
which hold no particular allegiance to any particular country or specific
geographical locale.119 In many nations, they are left free to corrupt
national leaders, exploit national resources, and essentially evade national
controls. 120 Despite their obvious role in the human rights area, the U.N.
has been unable to help restrain these entities.
121
Unless these fundamental problems are addressed, the joy marked on
the faces of the tired and hopeful masses, casting their ballots for the first
time, will soon be replaced by frustration, anger or despair. Some recent
actions by the U.N. General Assembly could be read as evidence that the
U.N. has begun considering policies and processes that would both
expand its ambit of electoral involvement and promote a deepened concep-
tion of democracy, thus reducing the need for periodic narrowly structured
human rights and democracy." Steven Lee Meyers, U.S. Opens Quiet Talks with Rulers of
Nigeria, N.Y. TIMms, Aug. 28, 1996, at A9.
117. See, e.g., Marilyn Greene, Activists Push Cause of 'Brutal' Nigeria, USA TODAY,
July 21, 1995, at A8; Seth Mydans, Burmese Win Observer Status in Southeast Asian
Group, N.Y. TIMaS,July 22, 1996, atA7; Nigeria's Waiting Game, N.Y. TIES, May 6, 1996,
at A14.
118. See, e.g., Howard French, Two Missions in Africa, But a Common Complaint, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1996, at A3.
119. Current conceptions of liberal democracy take these interest groups out of the
public or political sphere. As such, civil society, and indeed, most governments, have
little or no control over them even when they influence or corrupt the political sphere. A
deepened democratic program's major task would be to expand the political sphere to
reach these entities, especially through multinational regulation. The activities of mul-
tinational oil companies in Nigeria stand as a fascinating example of the need for such
regulation. These companies, led by Shell Oil, provide the bulk of money that funds one
of the world's most corrupt and brutal regimes. While they claim to have no power to
influence a "sovereign country's policies," the regime continues to execute some of their
most persistent Nigerian critics. Meanwhile, these companies continue to exploit Nige-
ria's oil and pollute the country's environment with the protection of the Nigerian "gov-
ernment" and the acquiescence of the international system. See Rob Nixon, The Oil
Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at A31; see generally RIcHARD J. BARNEr & JOHN
CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DRaMS (1995); WILLIAM GamrDE, ONE WORLD READY OR NoT-THE
MAmc LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPrrAUsM (1997).
120. For example, Shell Oil has been accused of complicity, if not outright support, of
the violent government crackdowns that led to the eventual execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa.
See Lewis, supra note 90.
121. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the one
U.N. body which sought to inform the regulation of the global market place with the
perspectives of developing countries was threatened with extinction by the world's lead-
ing industrialized countries until it discovered the free market ideology. See Mark Tran,
UNCTAD Learns to Love Multinationals, MAIL & GuARDiAN, May 24-30 1996, at B4. See
generally Incorporating the World, supra note 28.
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electoral interventions. One day after the U.N. reaffirmed "that there is no
universal need for the United Nations to provide electoral assistance to
Member States," 122 the General Assembly passed a resolution recom-
mending "that the United Nations ... provide assistance before and after
elections have taken place, including needs assessment missions aimed at
recommending programmes which might contribute to the consolidation
of the democratization process.... -1 23 However, these actions could also
be more realistically interpreted as further evidence of the confused state of
the U.N.'s attitude towards human rights. Even the latter more expansive
recommendation retains the limitation on U.N. democratic assistance to
requests by governments in power.124 That the principle that people
deserve only as much democracy as their governments are willing to
request-essentially, the international dimension requirement-remains the
foundation of current U.N. policy.
In section three, I offer some ideas about how the U.N. can widely
promote a deepened conception of democracy, consistent with its human
rights responsibilities. I argue that in order for the U.N. to be successful in
this mission, it should be transformed to reflect better the interests of the
world's inhabitants, unmediated by governments and traditional notions of
sovereignty.
The first step in this process, however, should be to locate better justi-
fications for a U.N. policy of involvement in national political affairs,
which would generate alternatives to the current requirements of clear
international dimension or governmental request. In the next part, I pro-
pose that the U.N.'s human rights obligations provide a broad and suffi-
cient rationale for such involvement.
II. The Human Rights Rationale for U.N. Involvement in National
Political Affairs
In this section, I argue that: (1) the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, provide a firm human rights foundation for U.N. involvement in
national political affairs; and (2) these documents support a human rights
rationale for broader U.N. involvement, embodying a more progressive
vision of democratic governance. Such involvements would be independ-
ent of specific requests for electoral assistance by governments or a finding
of an international dimension. 125 In Part III, I maintain that the time is
ripe for developing just such a policy which I label "democratic guardian-
ship," consisting of routine, comprehensive and collective democratic
involvements, designed to nurture and advance fundamental human rights
in all nations.
122. G.A. Res. 124, supra note 99.
123. G.A. Res. 131, supra note 99 (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. Of course, the policy would only apply after the members of the U.N. have con-
sidered and adopted it as a body.
Cornell International Law Journal
A. The U.N. Charter
The constitution of the United Nations, the U.N. Charter, begins with a
strong commitment to human rights promotion, prominently featured
alongside the post-war goal of preventing future international conflicts and
conditions fostering such conflicts. 126 The Charter's origins lay in the pre-
occupation of Allied war time leaders, with "sav[ing] succeeding genera-
tions from the scourge of war . . .. 127 An overriding concern of the
Charter's drafters was to eliminate or reduce the causes and consequences
of international conflicts. However, immediately following this eminent
post-war goal in the Charter's architecture was an explicit commitment "to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women ... "128
Human rights scholars trace the origins of modern international
human rights law to the horrors of the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities
during the Second World War.129 The U.N. Charter was the first step in
the "codification of international standards to protect human rights."
130
The Charter provided the foundation for what was later dubbed the "Inter-
national Bill of Rights," 13 1 consisting of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
the Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant.13 2 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights13 3 can be understood as elaborating the
human rights commitments of U.N. members that were only briefly articu-
lated in the U.N. Charter. The two covenants and the Optional Protocol are
in many respects more concrete elaborations of the commitments
126. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. However, traditional interpretations of U.N. purposes, for
example, have adopted a distinct hierarchy with sovereignty and maintenance of interna-
tional peace goals ranked above human rights. See, e.g., TomJ. Farer, Human Rights In
Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117, 118 (1991).
127. U.N. CHARTR preamble. See also GooDaIcH Er AL-, supra note 23, at 2-3; ROBERT
C. HILDERBRAND, DUMBARTON OAKS 2-29 (1990); Rum B. RuSsELL, A HISTORY OF THE
UNrrED NATIONS CHARTER 50-56 (1958).
128. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. Ironically, the initial draft of the preamble was proposed by
Field Marshall Smuts of South Africa. The human rights language of the preamble
essentially reflects his proposal. RussELL, supra note 127, at 911-18. In addition to its
prominence as part of the preamble of the Charter, support for human rights is also
featured as one of the general purposes of the United Nations, identified in Chapter I of
the Charter. Article 1(3) commits the U.N. "[tio achieve international co-operation in
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian charac-
ter, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. CHARrmt
art. 1, para. 3. Further expressions of U.N. human rights obligations appear in several
other places in the Charter. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 55, 56. See also GooDIcH, supra
note 23, at 26-27, 34-35, 370-82.
129. See FRANK NEwMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS 1-3
(1990); BROWNLE, supra note 18, at 564.
130. NEwmAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 129, at 1.
131. See generally INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 66.
132. See id. at 361-403.
133. G.A. Res. 217(111), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 371-77.
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expressed in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration. 13
4
The U.N. Charter does not contain an explicit right to democratic gov-
ernance or any form of political participation. However, the Charter's
human rights clauses provide the foundation for this important aspect of
these fundamental rights.1 35 While maintenance of international peace
and security and self-determination responsibilities have motivated past
and current U.N. electoral involvements, recognition of a global responsi-
bility for human rights, rooted in the U.N. Charter, should provide better
legal and political justifications for U.N. promotion of political participa-
tion through various means, including deepened electoral involvements in
independent nations.136 This reading of the U.N. Charter places human
rights at center, with the maintenance of international peace and security,
and support for self-determination being understood as necessary but not a
sine qua non for promoting the political participation aspects of human
rights.
Getting the U.N. to act forthrightly on its human rights responsibilities
has been neither easy nor popular. There has been a strong tendency
within the U.N. to treat the organization as essentially an elite club for
nation-states, mainly concerned with international conflict management.
The interests of "We The Peoples of the United Nations" was long ago sub-
sumed by the needs of member governments.137 These governments, act-
ing in the name of their citizens, have vigorously resisted a meaningful role
for the U.N. or the global community in holding states accountable for
abusing the rights of these citizens. At the same time, these governments
willingly bind themselves to international documents guaranteeing their
citizens fundamental rights.
138
The South African Apartheid-era government was one of the earliest
examples. For several decades, it objected to U.N. jurisdiction concerning
its treatment of non-white citizens. 139 Other nations, including many who
rejected South Africa's stance and supported U.N. intervention in South
134. International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Political to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316, reprinted in INTERNATiONAL BIu. OF RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 377-403.
135. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 5, at 91-110. As Beigbeder points out, if the U.N. had
been a league of (liberal) democracies at its inception, many of its members, including
the Soviet Union, would not have been eligible for membership. Id. at 93. The U.N.
Charter promotes the protection of fundamental freedoms without specifically defining
them to exclude non-liberal democratic formulations. See U.N. CHAT-ER arts. 1(3), 13,
55, 56, and 76.
136. See BEIGBEDER, supra note 5, at 148-87.
137. U.N. CHGRT pmbl. The United States delegation proposed the "We The Peo-
ples of the United Nations" language to "emphasize that the Charter was an expression
of the wills of the peoples of the world." GOODRICH Er AL., supra note 23, at 21. The final
language of the preamble was modified to reflect that the agreement was between gov-
ernments while purporting to represent the desires of the peoples of the world. Id.
138. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, had 135
states parties as of November 1996. G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 134.
139. See generally Uunrm NATIONS, THE Urn=i NATIONS AND APARTHED , supra note 40;
Gassama, supra note 25.
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Africa, similarly rejected U.N. scrutiny of their own human rights prac-
tices.14 0 Like South Africa, they did so in the name of national sovereignty.
While these countries were adamant about collective Charter-based respon-
sibility to inquire beyond the South African government's assertion of legit-
imacy and to require confirmation from the South African people through
internationally-monitored elections, they objected to similar scrutiny of
their own national policies. 14 1 The core human rights imperative since the
founding of the U.N. has been to overcome this pessimistic and pinched
vision of the global community and create a world resolutely bound
together by shared concerns for human dignity and clear communal
responsibility for the defense of fundamental human rights. 142
An unvarnished recognition of a Charter-derived global responsibility
to promote human rights will be an important step toward anchoring the
idea of human rights in a substantive conception of the good society.143 A
major task of human rights advocates is to read and apply the U.N. Char-
ter's promises in a manner that rejects a reified understanding of human
rights and a valorizing of concepts like sovereignty. Instead, human rights
advocates should promote a mature understanding of the intimate connec-
tions between the behavior of governments toward their people and their
international behavior. Of course, it will be substantially a matter of expe-
diency. 144 What worked against South Africa may take a little more time
against the People's Republic of China, for example. 145 Anchoring U.N.
electoral involvements in independent countries to the human rights
140. See Friedman, supra note 59 (discussing one instance in which China and Nige-
ria, two formerly staunch apartheid foes, objected to U.N. intervention in internal
affairs).
141. Id.
142. See RussELL, supra note 127, at 323-29, 423-24 (describing the attempt after
WWII to create an International Bill of Rights and the inclusion of human rights in the
U.N. Charter).
143. See Mortonj. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393, 404-06 (1988). A
substantive conception of a good society necessarily incorporates a vision of human
rights that is much deeper than the present view, requiring collective responsibility to
act against socio-economic inequality within and across borders. Under this vision of a
deepened or radical democracy, the international community, unlike the classical liberal
democratic state, will not be neutral concerning the issue of inequality. However, cur-
rent U.N. attitudes, by emphasizing the territorial nature of democracy and ignoring the
international sources of oppressive governance as well as the role of global and domestic
inequality in such conditions, do essentially just that.
144. This remark paraphrases the perspective of a noted American jurist, although
offered in a somewhat different context: "It is all a question of expediency. There are
no fixed rules to govern our judgment." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.t. Co., 162 N.E. 99,
104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
145. The critical move involves addressing the problem in its totality and beginning a
comprehensive dialogue. The Cold War era, in a sense, froze the dialogue about the
nature of democracy. During that period, the various participants locked themselves
into their respective visions and hurled insults and threats against relatively impregna-
ble borders. Now we have the opportunity to push the dialogue forward, starting from
the liberal democratic foundation which has proven more resilient and inspirational
than its critics had anticipated but yet remains so fundamentally unsatisfying that we
could by no means conclude with it. See, e.g., WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAt. A BOOK Is AN
ELEGANT OFFENSE (1995); Coombe, supra note 76.
Vol. 30
1997 Safeguarding the Democratic Entitlement
imperative would be a critical step along the path toward a deepened
understanding of democracy.
B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The U.N. General Assembly took a major step in constructing a progra-
matic international scheme for the protection of human rights by approv-
ing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) on December
10, 1948.146 The Declaration contained the first clear expression of
United Nations' support for the right to political participation as a key
aspect of this comprehensive human rights scheme:
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures.
14 7
The primary reason why this right and the other enumerated rights,
were spelled out in the Declaration and not in the Charter itself is well
known. Traditionally, the Declaration is understood not to have the same
legal effect on states as does the Charter or subsequent human rights cove-
nants. 14 8 In fact, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
14 9
the arm of the Economic and Social Council which drafted the Declaration,
conceded that the Declaration was only a first step in the elaboration of a
146. G.A. Res. 217(111), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. Some
authorities describe this document in almost lyrical terms that:
To this day, it [the Declaration] retains its symbolism, rhetorical force and signif-
icance in the human rights movement. It is the parent document, the initial
burst of idealism and enthusiasm, terser, more general and grander than the
treaties, in some sense the constitution of the entire movement. It remains the
single most invoked human rights instrument.
HE RYJ. STEINER & PHILIP AISToN, INTENATIONAL HumAN RIGHTS IN Corrr 120 (1996).
147. UDHR art. 21. The right of equal access to public service is essentially ignored
by traditional U.N. practice except in the context of elections.
148. See STEINE & ALSTON, supra note 146, at 123-24. For example, the human rights
provisions of the U.N. Charter have been interpreted by the International Court of Jus-
tice to create legal obligations on members of the organization, at least with regard to "a
territory having international status." See Legal Consequences for States of the Contin-
ued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 LCJ. 16, 57 (June 21). See also Egon Schwelb, The
International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM.J. INT'L
L. 337 (1972) (in which the author took a more expansive view of these obligations).
149. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights was created in 1946 as an arm of the
U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). See U.N. DEPT. OF PUBLIC INFORMATION,
BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNrr= NATIONS 193-94 (1995). ECOSOC, one of the principal
organs of the U.N., is charged with, among other things, primary responsibility for
accomplishing the human rights goals of the organization. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 7(1),
55-72. For more information on the work of ECOSOC, the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, and the other U.N. bodies engaged in human rights work, see UNrrmE NATIONS,
HuMAN RIGHTS MACHINERY: FACT SHEEr No. 1 (1987). See also THE UNrrED NATIONS AND
HuMAN RrGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
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human rights program, that it was not a treaty, and that it did not impose
legal obligations.' 50 Clearly, many nations were not ready to make spe-
cific internationally binding human rights commitments in 1948. How-
ever, this reticence was only temporary for the Declaration quickly became
the "spiritual parent of and inspiration for many human rights treaties."1 51
With regard to the right to political participation, the clarity of the Declara-
tion's language, coupled with reaffirmation of the right of political partici-
pation nearly twenty years later in the more legally binding International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant), 152 leaves little doubt as
to the importance attached to this right by the international community.
153
However, U.N. practice has minimized the importance of the Declara-
tion in approving electoral missions to independent countries. Whether
there is an international dimension and an invitation from the national
government have become the key considerations in determining U.N.
involvement'15 4 The commitments U.N. members made in the Declaration
and other human rights documents play largely secondary roles, providing
standards for evaluating the electoral process after the decision to intervene
has been made. Given its special place in the development of an interna-
tional human rights legal culture and its clear enunciation of the right to
political participation, the Declaration should play a more prominent role
not only in deciding when to approve electoral missions, but also in shap-
ing a broader program of U.N. involvement in the political affairs of
independent nations.
C. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would be the cyno-
sure of an international scheme for expanded and deepened U.N. involve-
150. Report of the third session of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 7th
Sess., Supp. No. 2, Agenda Item No. 17, at 8, U.N. Doc. E/800 (1948). But see Louis B.
Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than
States, 32 Am. U. L. REv. 1, 17 (1982) ("The Declaration, as an authoritative listing of
human rights, has become a basic component of international customary law, binding
on all states .... ").
151. Steiner, supra note 30, at 79. Buergental compares the Declaration with the
Magna Carta, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the American Declara-
tion of Independence, describing it as a "normative instrument that creates at least some
legal obligations for Member States of the U.N." THomAs BU RGEmrAL, INTmATIoNAL
HuMAN RiGHTs IN A NursHEu 30-33 (2d ed. 1995).
152. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly at New York on December 16, 1966 but it did not
enter into force until March 23, 1976. See Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE INTERNAnONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
66, at 66. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc.
A16316 (1967).
153. "Many governments have taken the position that the Declaration defines human
rights and fundamental freedoms which members of the United Nations are legally obli-
gated to respect. . ." GOODIUCH Er AL., supra note 23, at 378. The authors argue that
some U.N. General Assembly resolutions such as G.A. Res. 1663 (XVI), Nov. 28, 1961,
on the racial policies of the South African government, demonstrate support for the posi-
tion of these governments. Id. at 378, n.42.
154. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
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ment in national political affairs. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights
developed a draft of the Covenant at about the same time it completed the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.15 5 However, it took the U.N.
eighteen years after it approved the Declaration before it adopted the Cove-
nant in 1966. It took another ten years for the Covenant-the world's most
comprehensive human rights treaty-to enter into force. 15 6 One indication
of the Covenant's controversial history is that the United States refused to
ratify it until 1992.157 Despite this difficult beginning, the development
and adoption of the Covenant, even given the inevitable contingent and
contested interpretations of its component guarantees, should be seen as a
positive step for those desiring greater substantive protection for oppressed
people and an elevated place for human rights in international affairs.
The Covenant moved the broad, often vague aspirational declarations
on human rights contained in the U.N. Charter and the Declaration into
the realm of more contoured, less reified and less nebulous commitments.
It offered something to at least a few lucky individuals who may be allowed
a visit from international delegations of human rights bureaucrats or activ-
ists as a consequence.' 58 Even the state parties that did not subscribe to
155. See GOODRICH ET AL, supra note 23, at 378-79 (noting G.A. Res. 421 (V), Dec. 4,
1950; 543 (VI), Feb 5, 1952). The U.N. Human Rights Commission had prepared a
draft Covenant which it submitted to the U.N. General Assembly at the same time as it
submitted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948. The Assembly had
greater problems with the more legally binding Covenant than it did with the more
aspirational Declaration, and the latter was more readily approved while the former was
sent back for revisions. See Pechota, supra note 152, at 32-40. See also Louis Henkin,
Introduction, in THE INTErmATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 8-11. Among the
principal concerns raised about the draft Covenant was the absence of economic, social
and cultural rights. Pechota, supra note 152, at 4143. The U.N. General Assembly later
requested that two covenants be prepared. one for civil and political rights and one for
economic, social and cultural rights. G.A. Res. 543 (VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp.
No. 20, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952). See also THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANI-
ZATION OF PEAcE, THE UNrrED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 59-169 (1968).
156. Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its twin, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were approved and
opened for signature at the same time. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). An Optional Protocol to the Political Covenant,
under which parties allow their nationals to bring human rights petitions against them,
was also approved. See U.N. G.A. Res., 2200A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966; 999 U.N.TS 171,
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967). See also BAsic DOcuMNENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 262,
298.302 (Ian Brownlie ed., 4th ed. 1995). All three documents took effect in 1976. The
U.S. has not ratified the Optional Protocol. Id. at 262. See RIcHARD B. LIumr & HURST
HANNum, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACnCE 214 (3d
ed. 1995).
157. U.S. ratification was subject to several Reservations, Understandings, Declara-
tions and Proviso. The ratifying resolution focused the concerns on Covenant articles
guaranteeing equal protection of the law and "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment." See 138 CONG. REc. S4781, S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (printing the
U.S Senate's resolution of codification of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights and the reservations the Senate's advice and consent was subject thereto).
158. For a less traditional account of one such visit, see David Kennedy, Spring Break,
63 TEx. L. Ray. 1377 (1985).
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the Optional Protocoll 5 9 -created under the Covenant to grant nationals of
signatory states the right to bring violations of human rights complaints
against their nations before the United Nations-did commit themselves
nonetheless to respecting relatively well-enunciated global civil and polit-
ical rights. 160 These commitments have been crucial to developing a global
human rights culture despite the lack of will to enforce human rights on
any consistent basis and other weaknesses in the present global scheme. 16 1
Recent developments in South Africa, Cambodia, and Haiti for example,
support this mixed perspective on the state of a global human rights
culture.'
62
The U.N. played a key role in bringing about the positive changes that
have taken place in these countries.' 63 Yet, U.N. involvement in all of these
countries was predicated on finding an "international dimension" to the
problems afflicting them. Thus violations of the guarantees in the Cove-
nant, including the right to political participation, by themselves, were not
deemed sufficient to justify U.N. involvement.16 4 Given widespread
human rights abuses, including denial of the right to political participa-
tion, in many independent countries, it is unacceptable for the U.N. to con-
tinue to constrain itself from supporting the fundamental right to political
participation in situations lacking an "international dimension." Wide-
spread optimism and acceptance of the global movement for democracy in
the post-Cold War era should not obscure the fact that U.N. involvement in
this popular revolution has been largely limited by sovereignty-based con-
cerns such as the international dimension predicate and by generally con-
stricted visions of both human rights and democracy.
I argue for an expanded U.N. role in promoting a deepened vision of
human rights and political participation with full recognition that recep-
tion of such a role for the U.N. depends on whether the organization could
truly represent the interests of the "peoples of the United Nations" 16 5 and
159. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M.
383 (1967).
160. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND PoLrICAL RIGHTS art. 2.
161. See Steiner, supra note 53.
162. All three countries have experienced major political changes mediated by a pro-
cess in which free and fair elections monitored and legitimated by the international com-
munity was a central feature. U.N. electoral observer missions played critical roles in
these countries. For more on the U.N. electoral role, see the following volumes pub-
lished by the United Nations in its Blue Books series: THE UNIrm NATIONS, THE UNITD
NATIONS AND CAMODA, 1991-1995 (1995); THE UrnIE NATIONS, THE UNrITE NATIONS
AND APARTHEID, 1948-1994, supra note 40; see also Lucia Mouat, U.N. Role Grows in Cen-
tral America, CHmsTIAN Sci. MoNrroR, Jan. 7, 1991, at 3; Lucia Mouat, Observers Laud
Haiti's Achievement: Election Monitors Say Haitian People Overcame Poverty, Illiteracy, to
'Get It Right' this Time, CHRuI Sci. MONITOR, Dec. 21, 1990, at 6.
163. See UNITED NATIONS, THE UrInTE NATIONS AND CAMBODIA, supra note 162; UNrrED
NATIONS, THE UNrED NAIoNs AN APARTHEID, supra note 40; Mouat, Observers Laud
Haiti's Achievement, supra note 162.
164. See U.N. CErRE FOR HumAN RIGHTS, supra note 3.
165. U.N. CuARTE pmbl. This is not to suggest that the category of peoples is
unproblematical. On the contrary, figuring out which communities constitute various
"peoples" would be anything but easy. However, this is a welcome and necessary part of
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not just those of the governments of the United Nations or even worse, of
just some of those governments. In Part Ill, I will elaborate on the qualities
of a deepened vision of human rights and democracy and on how the polit-
ical participation guarantees of the Covenant would constitute the heart of
this vision.
III. Expanding and Deepening Human Rights: "Democratic
Guardianship" as U.N. Policy
But the aspirations of the human rights movement reach beyond the goal of
preventing disasters. The movement also has a 'utopian' dimension that
envisions a vibrant and broadly based political community.
Henry Steiner 1
6 6
With the Cold War's end, the U.N. is in a position, consistent with
progressive global sentiments, to reinterpret and broaden its mandate to
support human rights across sovereign borders.16 7 Arguably, there is a
decreasing chance for significant conflicts between major powers over U.N.
human rights interventions. 16 8 Human rights scholars, for example, are
writing more optimistically about the U.N.'s potential role in promoting
democracy. 169 There is wide agreement that democratic governance, at
least as defined by the right to political participation, including free and
fair elections, is a key component of the International Bill of Rights.'
70
The U.N. should orient its policies and practices to more actively sup-
port the human rights aspirations and prescriptions contained in the U.N.
Charter and the International Bill of Rights. Its reticence about breaching
national jurisdictional lines and becoming enmeshed in the politics of
a deepened vision of democracy: a recognition of the possibilities of multiple identities
and complex interactions. Moving from a state-centered system to a "peoples"-centered
one does not signify the end of politics.
166. Steiner, supra note 53, at 931.
167. For example, even though the U.N. failed to act effectively to prevent gross viola-
tions of human rights in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, there is widespread
support within the U.N. for the War Crimes tribunal established to prosecute leaders
and others who encouraged or carried out violations of international law. See M. CHlalF
BAssIouNI, THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL REs-
OLUTION 780: INVESTIGATING VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE
FoRmER YuGosLAvIA (1996). See also Nigerians Protest, supra note 1 (illustrating the sen-
timent that the U.N. should broaden its role).
168. China appears to be the only major power at present with a seriously diverging
perspective on U.N. involvement in national political affairs. See Friedman, supra note
59; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47, at 140-52. Of course, the depth of Russia's
support for such involvement is difficult to gauge as it deals with its own "domestic"
political situation. On Russia's unstable situation, see id. at 277-34. China's generally
hostile attitude toward such U.N. involvements could raise significant obstacles for the
program advocated in this Article. A major aspect of the program, however, is an appre-
ciation for ongoing engagement with all perspectives. It seems that much of China's
concerns have to do with how ideas like democracy could mask imperial ambition. The
dialogue and reciprocity advocated by the project of democracy guardianship should
help deal with the concerns of countries like China.
169. See Fielding, supra note 103; Hodgson, supra note 82; Stoelting, supra note 3.
170. See Franck, supra note 11.
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independent nations should be abandoned. The considerable experience
obtained by the U.N. from its decolonization and post-independence elec-
tions-monitoring missions should be utilized to develop and nurture demo-
cratic governance in independent nations. It is important, however, that
this U.N. policy apply to all nations and not just to those whose govern-
ments have been pressured by particular circumstances to extend invita-
tions to the U.N. for limited electoral missions.171 Such a policy, outlined
in the remainer of this Article, can be described as democratic
guardianship.
A. "Democratic Guardianship" Outlined
Democratic guardianship, as envisioned in this Article, would be a compre-
hensive, coordinated, routine, and non-forcible U.N. program to develop,
sustain and promote democratic governance in the fullest sense. Demo-
cratic guardianship opens space for an expanded and deepened practice of
democracy unconstrained by rigid distinctions between the domestic and
foreign, or politics and economics. 172 Instead of rejecting liberal democ-
racy, democratic guardianship would build upon liberal democractic ideals
or myths1 73 to argue for more communal, proactive, and sustained
national and international responses to the fundamental collective interests
of humanity.174
U.N. democratic guardianship complements the doctrine of collective
humanitarian intervention, 175 and it is just as defensible. Humanitarian
intervention, particularly when authorized by the U.N., is the primary
exception to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of sover-
171. See Stoelting, supra note 3, at 372-73.
172. See David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy: John Jack-
son and the Field of International Economic Law, 10 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 671 (1995)
(addressing one form of this division: public international law and international eco-
nomic law).
173. Nelson Mandela in his autobiography captured the power of these ideals when
he cited the Atlantic Charter of 1941 as a source of inspiration for anti-apartheid strug-
gle. For Mandela, the Charter "reaffirmed faith in the dignity of each human being and
propagated a host of democratic principles." See NELsON MANDELA, LONG WALK To FREE.
DOM 83 (1994). See also, DAHL, supra note 25; Franck, supra note 11.
174. Liberal democracy has already won the hearts and minds of the masses in the
Third World because of its clear articulation of people's concern vis-a-vis the nation-
state. By acknowleging this triumph, it might be possible to rectify some of liberal
democracy's failures, especially concerning "private" economic power and its veneration
of the sovereign state. See, e.g., LAcIAu & MouFr, supra note 108, at 176. Dahl touches
on the issues raised by "the myth of the autonomous democratic state," and how
changes in scale affect "the capacity of the citizens" to control matters at a national, as
opposed to a transnational, level. See D~a, supra note 25, at 3-5, 319-21.
175. See Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CvIL WAR IN THE MoD.
ERN WoIa 217, 217-18 (John N. Moore ed., 1974); Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian
Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAw AND
Crvi WAR n THE MODEM WORLD, supra, at 229, 229-49. See also Ruth E. Gordon,
Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, 31 Tax. Irrr'L
LJ. 43, 44-46 (1996).
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eign nations.176 As such, the idea of democratic guardianship might con-
jure up negative connotations, bringing up memories of the Reagan
Doctrine and George Bush's "New World Order." However, unlike such
previous efforts at American or Western hegemony, democratic guardian-
ship should reject unilateral interventions by powerful nations to remove
governments they deem unfit.177 Nor would democratic guardianship
embrace even U.N.-approved interventions of a similar sort, such as the
removal of the Cedras government in Haiti. 178 Indeed, while it shares the
human rights pedigree of humanitarian intervention, democratic guardian-
ship is distinct, being narrower in its means but broader in its scope than
humanitarian intervention.179 It would be narrower in the sense that it
would not in itself justify armed interventions to remove a government. It
would be broader in the sense that it would actively and routinely apply the
same type of scrutiny to all countries, promote the widespread dissemina-
tion of information, and provide material support to civil society in every
country.
The present trend within the U.N. is to institutionalize support for
selective electoral involvements while programs enhancing a broader vision
of human rights remain undeveloped and scattered.180 A U.N. policy of
democratic guardianship would benefit from institutional resources, lim-
ited though they are, that already support ad hoc involvement in free and
176. Other established exceptions include interventions to protect the lives or prop-
erty of nationals abroad, and counter-interventions. See Derek W. Bowett, The Use of
Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad, in THE CuRRsrr LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
USE OF FORCE 39 (Antonio Cassesse ed., 1986). Counter-intervention is often cited in
conjunction with the right of collective self-defense by states who claim their interven-
tion is in response to prior intervention, or to enforce the principle of non-intervention.
See Oscar Schacter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620 (1984).
A few scholars have suggested various other justifications for uninvited interventions-to
support wars of national liberation, to control the spread of nuclear weapons, to control
dwindling resources, to assist one faction in a civil conflict, etc.
177. The Reagan administration's destabilization campaigns against Angola and Nica-
ragua, and the U.S. invasions of Grenada and Panama to replace unfriendly governments
all serve as examples of this type of unilateral intervention.
178. See Fielding, supra note 103.
179. Some commentators have advocated a form of democratic intervention, generally
described as "pro-democratic" intervention, or intervention to "restore democracy." See
Fielding, supra note 103, at 343; DavidJ. Scheffer, Toward A Modern Doctrine of Humani-
tarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 253, 292 (1992). This type of intervention is
generally justified as a form of humanitarian intervention. Though it shares similar
aims as the policy of U.N. democratic guardianship discussed in this Article, it is too
narrowly focused on the exceptional cases. Democratic guardianship as advocated here
allows for ongoing, collective, in fact routine, actions to build, sustain and promote
human rights, including democratic governance in all communities.
180. This is the basic thrust of General Assembly Resolution 48/124, reaffirming
non-interference in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. G.A.
,Res. 48/124, supra note 2. See also High Commissioner for Human Rights: the 'Moral
Voice of Humanity, U.N. CHRON.,June 1994, at 46 [hereinafter Moral Voice] (an interview
with the newly appointed U.N. Human Rights Commissioner which pointed out the
urgent need for a coordinated approach to human rights promotion under the current
structure).
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fair elections.181 In particular, the U.N. Centre for Human Rights and the
newly created position of High Commissioner for Human Rights could
respond to the need for better coordination of U.N. human rights pro-
grams. 18 2 However, democratic guardianship will require the U.N. to seek
broader support and develop constituencies within and outside the U.N.
system. The International Labour Organization (ILO), for example, already
uses well-developed mechanisms for bringing together representatives of
government, labor, and industry to change working conditions within
countries.18 3 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) has functioned as a forum for examining the role of multina-
tional enterprises in developing countries.' 8 4 Numerous human rights
non-governmental organizations have engaged in elections monitoring and
other democratic governance projects. Democratic guardianship would
promote close collaboration among these institutions-a hybrid mix of the
public and private, the local, the national and the multinational-to deepen
the democratic imperative.
Democratic guardianship should be routine in the sense that it will be
ongoing in every country, not just a few generally Third World countries
deemed as problem cases. The point would be to make the process ordi-
nary instead of exceptional. Democratic guardianship would not be predi-
cated on crises that meet some vague, indeterminate international
dimension or threat to international peace and security criterion. Even
countries with established systems of governance and free of starving
populations or persistent violent rebellions could benefit from U.N. demo-
cratic guardianship.1
8 5
181. See U.N. CENrR FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3.
182. As yet, the High Commissioner has little more than moral authority. See Moral
Voice, supra note 180, at 46-47. See also Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
supra note 38.
183. The considerable experience of the International Labour Organizatin (ILO) in
working across the public/private and the national/international divides to obtain con-
crete, albeit modest, results should be valuable in constructing a system of democratic
guardianship. See Francis Wolf, Human Rights and the International Labour Organiza-
tion, in HuMAN RIGrrS IN I-EONAroMA. LAw 273 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); David M.
Trubek, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Third World: Human Rights Law and
Human Needs Programs, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra, at 205, 231-42.
184. See Note, Developing Countries and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and the
Promise of Development, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1715 (1995); Tran, supra note 121. See gener-
ally AuTAR KRIsHAN lCouL, THE LEGAL FRAmwom OF UNCTAD IN WoR.D TRADE (1977).
185. Undoubtedly, both the U.S. and countries with less stable political systems
would benefit from a more openly reciprocal practice. It should not be presumed that
less stable societies have nothing to teach the U.S. about democracy and human rights
generally. At present, the U.S. is frequently charged with promoting a double-standard
and using the rhetoric of human rights and democracy to humiliate or undermine disfa-
vored governments. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, Snubbing Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1996, sec. 4, at 3. Coupled with historic U.S. reluctance to bind itself to inter-
national human rights documents, this charge has seriously impeded the advancement
of human rights. See Smma & ALSrON, supra note 146, at 750-65 (surveying various
perspectives on U.S. responses to international human rights treaties). A more openly
reciprocal system, promoted under democratic governance, in which those who claim to
be democratic are subjected to the same standards as those who are not considered
sufficiently democratic should help to spur a more productive global dialogue about the
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B. Article 25 of the ICCPR as the Heart of Democratic Guardianship
To develop and implement a program of democratic guardianship, the U.N.
should build upon the work it has done in its electoral missions. In this
regard, the U.N. faces two major challenges: (1) developing international
consensus on the interpretation and implementation of elements of the
political participation right that are still controversial; and (2) expanding
the application of these political standards to those societies that so far are
deemed outside the scope of its electoral interventions.
Article 25 of the Covenant, which has provided the foundation for
U.N. election monitoring standards, would similarly be central to imple-
menting a U.N. program of democratic guardianship. Most of its elements
and principles have almost universal support. 18 6 I will briefly review the
settled as well as the controversial aspects, noting their implications for a
progam of democratic guardianship. Reaffirming the Declaration's right to
political participation, Article 25 of the Covenant states:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing
the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country.
18 7
nature and limits of democracy as a global standard. One additional benefit of more
international involvement in the politics of developed liberal democracies could be a
more searching examination of the way minorities fare in these societies. The United
States, for example, appears to endorse proportional representation in most countries
even as the domestic U.S. system rejects any movement in such a direction, or even
creative consideration of ways to improve political representation from minority com-
munities. See, e.g., LANI GuINmR, ThE TYRANwY OF THE MAJORnTY (1994); Richard Thomp-
son Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L REv.
1841 (1994).
186. See UNITED NATIONS, UNrr= NATIONS AND HuMAN RIGHTS, 1994-1995, at 38-50
(1995) (Bluebook Series); THE INTERNATIONAL BIu. OF RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 1-31.
187. INTERNATIONAL CovENANr ON CIvL AND PoLmcAL RIGHTS (ICCPR) art. 25, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The article 2 distinctions referred to by article 25 include
"... race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status." See id. art. 2 (1). Article 25 is only one of several
articles in the Covenant designed to broadly advance political participation rights. See
also Articles 19 (freedom to hold opinions and freedom of expression), 21 (right of
peaceful assembly), and 22 (freedom of association). Id. arts. 19, 22. See also Article 1
("All peoples have the right to self determination"). Id. art. 1. Thomas Franck, for exam-
ple, has argued that "Self-determination is the historic root from which the democratic
entitlement grew." See Franck, supra note 11, at 52. This Article cautions against this
view and suggests that the central focus of the Wilsonian concept of self-determination
on the rights of peoples or groups is fundamentally antithetical to the interests of indi-
viduals as global citizens, the underlying theme of present day international efforts to
define human rights as universal, indivisible and interdependent. See, e.g., Ammsry
INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1994, at 31-33 (1994).
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One commentator has interpreted Article 25 as containing essentially
"three principal guarantees: non-discrimination, the right to participate in
public affairs, and the right to free elections."' 88 An alternative, but not
altogether inconsistent interpretation of Article 25, would consider the
qualified non-discrimination requirement in the umbrella clause of the
article as a general yardstick by which the attainment of the following three
substantive guarantees of the Article are to be measured: (a) the right to
take part in the conduct of public affairs, (b) the right to vote and to be
elected, and (c) the right to have access to public service.
The non-discrimination requirement of Article 25 is not absolute.
First, the rights guaranteed in Article 25 are expressly reserved to citi-
zens.18 9 Second, Article 25 recognizes two classes of distinctions even
among citizens. The first class consists of distinctions already prohibited
in general under Article 2 of the Covenant: ".... race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status."190 The distinctions of the second class are those which
may be taken into account in implementing the elements of the right to
political participation. These distinctions are not specified, but they may
188. See Fox, supra note 8, at 553. Fox does not deal with Article 25(c) which guaran-
tees the right "To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his coun-
try." ICCPR, supra note 186, art. 25(c). He considers this provision to be "in effect, a
specialized non-discrimination clause." Id. at 553 n.59.
189. The issue of who is or could be a citizen should benefit from reconsideration
under a democratic governance program. Traditional U.N. practice hardly deals with
the complexities regarding citizenship raised in a world of multiple citizenships and
residences, increasingly connected and disconnected by technology or the lack thereof,
and without much regard for geographical boundaries. Democratic guardianship would
expose some of the false assumptions behind such an essentialist category, and open up
space for deeper participation in world affairs by all people. Africa, for example could
benefit tremendously from such a reconsideration. Predominantly Western-trained
elites came to power in former colonies after the formal departure of European colonial
authorities. These elites held on to the rhetoric of an "African people," even as they
entrenched the most fundamental of foreign import, the nation-state, with its long and
ignoble record of ruthlessly separating and tearing apart pre-colonial African communi-
ties. See generally BAsIL DAVIDSON, THE BLAcK MAN's BuRDEN: AFmcA AND THE CURsE OF
THE NATIoN-STATE (1992); see also WOLE SoYNC.A, THE OPEN SORE OF A CownNEwr 109-43
(1996). The net result today is that there is no "African people," outside of the fantasies
of entrenched elites and the dwindling number of pan-Africanists in the diaspora. See,
e.g., Makau Wa Mutua, Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again: The Dilemmas of
the Post-Colonial African State, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 505 (1995). On the contrary, few
states could even maintain unity without the monopoly of force represented by govern-
ments. African leaders have been woefully uncreative in responding to the multiple
identities of Africans, holding on to a rigid and, so far, unappetizing Western conception
of citizenship. One lesson of liberal democracy has been the intensely manipulable
nature of the citizenship category, used primarily to exclude others while building soli-
darity embracing the concept, "we." There is no magic to it.
190. ICCPR, art. 2 (1) states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recog-
nized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social ori-
gin, property, birth or other status.
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be made as long as they are not unreasonable. 191 It is generally accepted,
for example, that restrictions on the franchise based on age, mental illness,.
criminal conviction, and residency are not unreasonable. Therefore, these
distinctions do not constitute discrimination under the Covenant. 192
The right to participate in public affairs and the right to have access to
public service have additional qualifications beyond the allowance of rea-
sonable restrictions. The former may be exercised either directly, or
through "freely chosen representatives." 193 The latter specifically requires
only "general terms of equality."194 These two rights, however, have
received less scrutiny than the right "[to] vote and to be elected .... -95
The right to vote and to be elected has been interpreted to be a guaran-
tee "that elections will be held and they should be free, without coercion or
pressure." 196 Several decades of varied practices among signatory States to
the Declaration and the Covenant illustrate different and conflicting inter-
pretations that have been accorded to this guarantee. One major disagree-
ment has been over the significance of political parties in assuring "free
and fair elections." 197 Many of the original parties to the Political Cove-
nant insisted that the exercise of these rights required a political climate
allowing for more than one list of candidates, that is, multi-party elec-
Id.
191. Fox, supra note 8, at 554.
192. The traditional unproblematic treatment of these exceptions would not persist
under democratic guardianship. Experience has shown the extreme indeterminacy of
these categories. Recall, that many people were judged insane or found guilty of serious
crimes for opposing the former Soviet regime. Sexual orientation could lead to criminal
convictions or loss of rights in many countries. Concerning age restrictions, in many
countries, children work long hours or even fight in wars even as they are denied a role
in the political process. See generally Victoria Brittain, Army of Children Fight Adult
Wars, THE GuARDIAN, Nov. 1, 1996, at 16; Steven Lee Meyers, Clothing Makers Taking
Steps to Limit Child Labor Abroad, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 21, 1996, at A10. Mass migrations,
the treatment of immigrants in many developed countries, the increased mobility of the
techno-class, and indeed the creative political arrangements in Bosnia have also raised
serious questions about traditional conceptions of residency. See SASmA SAssEN, LOSING
CONTROL?: SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBAUZATION (1996); Michael Hill, As Rwandan
Refugees Head for Home, Camp Turns into a Ghost Town, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 18, 1996, at
8A; Laura Kay Rozen, For Bosnians, a Jobless Peace: Economy Struggles to Revive, CrRIS-
TmAN Sc. MONITOR, Nov. 20, 1996, at 9; Colin Woodard, Few Welcome Mats out for Bos-
nia's Refugees, CHISTmN Sc. MONITOR, Sept. 26, 1996, at 6. See also Karl Josef Partsch,
Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INErmNATIONAL BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 238; Fox, supra note 8, at 554.
193. 1CCPR art. 25(a). A proposal that all organs of authority be chosen through
direct elections was rejected, thus neither indirect election of one chamber of a parlia-
ment or a chief executive nor appointment of officials is prohibited. See Partsch, supra
note 154, at 239. The right to vote and be elected is an aspect of the right to participate
in the conduct of public affairs. Id.
194. ICCPR art. 25(c). This issue is particularly troubling in societies like South
Africa and Haiti where the unequal distribution of wealth is longstanding but the right
to vote is recent. See WILLIAm MINER, KING SOLOMON'S MINES RvErI (1986); SoUTm
AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, RACE RELATIONS SuRvEy, 1993/94 (1994); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 47, at 47-51, 100-06.
195. ICCPR art. 25(b).
196. Partsch, supra note 192, at 240.
197. Fox, supra note 8, at 556-57.
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tions. 198 Others insisted that the right could just as well be protected in
one-party societies. 199 Advocates of the latter view asserted that many
societies-because of their history, demography, or stage of economic and
social development-are better served when the socio-political divisions
that multiple political movements encourage are avoided.200 In support,
they argue that it would be quite possible for a single political party to
encompass a broad spectrum of views and positions.
201
While this debate may still have resonance at the theoretical level, time
is on the side of those who interpret Article 25 as incompatible with one-
party politics. The number of parties to the Covenant defending the one-
party option has dwindled considerably in recent years.202 While the fall
of communism in Eastern Europe played a major part in this decline of
support for legitimizing one-party elections, strong U.N. support for multi-
party elections-on those occasions when it has engaged in election admin-
istration, support or monitoring-has also been a significant factor.
20 3 It
should be acknowleged, however, that the U.N., as an entity, has not forth-
rightly advocated the position that one-party elections are incompatible
with Article 25 of the Political Covenant.20 4 A U.N. democratic guardian-
ship program would encourage open dialogue on the significance of polit-
ical parties in the development of a democratic society. To the degree that
one-party systems signify the limitation of choice-including the choice not
to choose from among the options presented within the one-party system-
they are dearly violative of the liberal democratic foundation of democratic
guardianship.
The meaning of "equal suffrage" has also provoked some disagree-
ments. A major dispute has been over whether it requires proportional rep-
resentation or allows for a winner-take-all system. 205 Supporters of a
198. Western nations have long maintained that multi-party elections are necessary
for "genuine choice." Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Tanzanian PresidentJulius Nyerere stated that "in the 1960's... the existence of
multiple political parties was not a prerequisite to genuine electoral choice." See Fox,
supra note 67, at 556-57. In the USSR, Communist Party leaders argued that the party
was capable of protecting the interests of. all the people. Id. at n.75.
202. See Franck, supra note 11, at 47. According to Professor Franck, "As of late
1991, there are more than 110 governments, almost all represented in the United
Nations, that are legally committed to permitting open, multiparty, secret-ballot elec-
tions with a universal franchise." Id. at 47. This number, of course, changes on an
almost regular basis since many Third World governments are threatened by, and some-
times sucumb to, military coups. See also supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text
(discussing U.S.-Cuba dispute).
203. See Fox, supra note 8, at 560.
204. Note that the 1991 U.N. General Assembly resolution entitled "Enhancing the
Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections," expressed support for
"... an electoral process that provides an equal opportunity for all citizens to become
candidates and put foward their political views, individually and in cooperation with
others..." G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 255, U.N. Doc. A/
45/1 (1991).
205. For example, the United Kingdom objected to the term "equal suffrage," fearing
that it would involve "the institution of some form of proportional representation." U.N.
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majority winner-take-all system argue that "equal suffrage" means only that
everyone has the same voting power, without implying that each vote
should be guaranteed equal effect in some kind of proportional representa-
tion system.206 This argument appears to have been strengthened by state
practices over time.
207
There have also been relatively minor disagreements over the mean-
ings of other terms and phrases describing the right to vote and to be
elected. For example, some parties to the Covenant took issue with the
requirement of a secret ballot, arguing that it disadvantaged their illiterate
citizens.20 8 Other parties expressed concern over permissible exceptions
to the "universal... suffrage" requirement.
209
U.N. practice, evidenced by the record of many of its electoral mis-
sions, has tracked the interpretations outlined above and helped to bring
greater clarity to the meanings of the various components of the right to
political participation, especially that of free and fair elections.210 By
adopting a clear and firm position on the interpretation of many of these
components, this U.N. practice has aided the process of clarification and
GAOR 10th Sess., Annexes, U.N. Doc. A/2910, add.1, at 7 (1955). The U.K. later with-
drew its objections to the term. U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess. 1096th mtg., at 179, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.1096 (1961).
206. Partsch argues that "[e]qual suffrage means that everyone has the same voting
power, it does not imply that each vote has the same effect." Partsch, supra note 192, at
240.
207. Current debates in the U.S. over so-called minority districts, created in large
measure to increase minority representation in the U.S. Congress, and the Supreme
Court's deep division over the constitutionality of such districts, indicate continuing
sharp divisions on the equal suffrage issue. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See
also Brenda Wright, The Myths Behind Shaw v. Reno, CoMm=a REPORT (Lawyers Com-
mittee For Civil Rights Under Law, New York, N.Y.), Vol. 5, No. 5 & 6, 1993, at 1. A
major goal of many supporters for the redrawing of voting districts was to remedy his-
toric underrepresentation of minorities in Congress. Opponents, at the core, rejected
the idea that certain minority groups have representational needs that could not be sat-
isfied by traditional winner-take-all politics. See generally GutNnm, supra note 185.
South Africa, on the other hand, is an example of a preference for proportional represen-
tation, with open acknowlegement that some minority groups might have representa-
tional needs that deserve recognition. The interim constitution in fact allowed for the
two leading minority parties to be given a number of positions in the cabinet of the
interim Government of National Unity. The leader of one, F.W. De Klerk, was one of the
country's two deputy presidents until he resigned in May, 1996. See S.A. CONST., §§ 40
(1), 48, 84 (1), (2), and 88 (2), (3).
208. "A secret ballot could be carried out only if the voters were able to read and
write. Illiterate people would thus be excluded from voting and sufferage would no
longer be universal." U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 3rd Sess., 132nd mtg. at 450 (1948)
(remarks of Haitian delegate Mr. Saint-Lot); "[I]lliterate people could only participate in
an open vote." Id. at 455 (remarks of Guatemalan delegate Mr. Garcia Bauer). But see
U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 3rd Sess., 133rd mtg. at 463 (1948) (remarks of Soviet delegate
Mr. Pavlov: "The declaration could not be based on the conditions prevailing in coun-
tries where illiterates were in the majority.").
209. The U.K., for example, objected to the term "universal" on the ground that it was
"redundant in view of the opening words of this article." U.N. GAOR 10th Sess.,
Annexes, U.N. Doc. A/2910 and Add.1 at 7. The U.S.S.R. also objected to any qualifica-
tions based on property or level of income. See U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 3rd Sess., 133rd
mtg., at 463, U.N. Doc. A/C.3 SR.133 (1948).
210. See generally Hodgsen, supra note 82.
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contributed to the stregthening of human right values. As such, while there
can be scholarly debates over whether free and fair election require party
pluralism, literacy standards, or proportional representation, for example,
U.N. practice has led to implementing standards for each of these compo-
nents that are now almost routinely followed.211 For example, U.N. prac-
tice has come down squarely on the side of party pluralism, weakening the
assertion that one-party democracies are consistent with the right to free
and fair elections. 212 At a minimum, the practices of the U.N. send an
uncomfortable message of disapproval to the leaders of the dwindling
number of one-party states.
The U.N. has also strongly promoted a broad interpretation of the
"universal and equal suffrage" component of the free and fair elections
guarantee.213 Virtually all U.N. electoral missions have encouraged and
facilitated the return of refugees and exiles prior to the elections. 214 In
keeping with its strong support for making the franchise as widely avail-
able as possible, U.N. practice also encourage very liberal voter eligibility
and registration requirements.
215
U.N. electoral missions in support of the right to political participation
provide a pathway to deeper international intervention on behalf of democ-
racy and social justice. The right to political participation is an important
building block of an international system which will help guard democratic
gains. While political participation does not by itself signify democracy or
guarantee social justice, it is undoubtedly seen by most of those working
against oppression as a critical part of any democratic or social justice
framework.2
16
The standards tested in the decolonization and "international dimen-
sion" contexts must now be enriched and put to service on behalf of all
people. No government should escape the scrutiny of international involve-
ment in domestic political processes. There are tremendous benefits to
making this involvement routine and reciprocative-to foster two-way
exchanges between citizens of established democracies, like the United
States and those of emerging democracies.
C. Objections to Democratic Guardianship as U.N. Policy
There would certainly be many objections, from both the left and right, to
an expanded U.N. role in promoting and sustaining democracy in
independent countries. The principal opposition would likely come from
211. See U.N. CErTR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 4-18.
212. Id. at 12-13.
213. Id. at 10-11. UDHR, art. 21 (3); ICCPR, art. 25(b).
214. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, THE UNrraD NATIONS AND APARTHEID, supra note 40, at
95-97, 115-19 (on the return of refugees and the U.N.'s mandate).
215. Id. See also U.N. CENTRE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 10-15.
216. One African scholar puts it this way: "It is now quite clear that without democ-
racy, there can be no accountability, and without popular participation and accountabil-
ity, there can be no genuine and sustainable development." Bade Onimode, A Critique of
Structural Adjustment Programmes and a Proposal for an African Alternative, THIRD
WORLD ECON., Jan. 16-31, 1992, at 12, 16.
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governments and other powerful public and private defenders of traditional
notions of sovereignty. In addition, Third World nationalists, in and
outside of governments, fearful that an expanded and intrusive U.N. man-
date would further strengthen foreign (Western) domination, would likely
prevent strong opposition.
Opposition should also be expected from many in the West who may
not object to the U.N. sending democratic guardianship delegations to
Third World or fomerly socialist countries, but would be scandalized by
the effrontery and cost of dispatching similar missions to Alabama, Que-
bec, or Wales. Moreover, a more substantive interpretation of democratic
governance that challenges dominant Western assumptions and deeply-
held beliefs would likely create strong objections from many quarters. In
particular, efforts to bring democracy to the private sector, that is, to make
economic matters more political, or to democratize international relations
should be expected to generate intense opposition. In the next section I
argue that efforts to expand and deepen democracy are necessary despite
these objections, given the importance of breaching the barriers national
boundaries create to human relations and social justice within and across
national lines.
D. Responses to Objections: Reimagining "We the Peoples"
Viewed from the outside, however, the Charter's chief defect is that it is exclu-
sively an interstate organization... If one of the purposes of Charter reform
is the enhancement of programs such as human rights and the environment,
then an instrumental goal should be a larger role for individuals and groups
not affiliated with states. The 'deadest letters' in the U.N. Charter are in its
very first words: 'We the Peoples of the United Nations.'
W. Michael Reisman
217
It is important to emphasize that requests for U.N. involvement in
national elections usually emanate from demands of those who lack state
power and fear the power of the state, or from those who are unafraid of
the will of the voters in any plebiscite. 218 At present, it would be remarka-
ble to find oppressed people in any part of the world who do not want
some international involvement in the conduct of national elections.
219
217. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 146 (citing W. MicuAL REISMAN, AMENDING THE
U.N. CHARTER: THE ART OF THE FEASIBLE, A.S.I.L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH ANNUAL MTG.,
1994 (1995)). Those of us who endorse the sentiments expressed above must acknowl-
ege, however, that no popular referendum of the "peoples" of the world preceded the
adoption of the U.N. Charter. On the contrary, it was conceived in wartime largely by
elitist diplomats, academics, and opinion-leaders, who properly saw it as a constructive
response to the global catastrophe that was the Second World War. Its creators by and
large never saw it as a substitute to national power or as a precursor to global federation.
On the origins of the U.N., see HILDERBRAND, supra note 107.
218. See Nigerians Protest, supra note 1.
219. In my experiences in Haiti and South Africa, I met few voters who did not
embrace the presence of international observers. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMIrEE FOR CVL
RIGHTS UNDER LAW, FINAL REPORT ON Soutm AFRICAN ELECTIONS (1994). Generally, the
few objections emanate from defenders of the status quo, or alienated intellectuals con-
cerned about the indeterminacy and manipulability of liberal democratic ideals and
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The growing demand for U.N. electoral involvements signify the develop-
ment of a global consensus on human rights as interdependent, indivisible
and universal.220 This should be seen also as an increasing rejection of
notions of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction as fixed, impermeable or
indivisible.
221
Requests for international electoral involvements should be seen as the
triumph of a more progressive understanding of the United Nations-a
body not only fostering the peace and security of member states, but also
pro-actively engaged in advancing global human rights. Expanding the
human rights role of the U.N. properly complements its expanded role in
the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-Cold War
era. Human rights promotion is entirely consistent with the U.N.'s historic
interpretation of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.222 The integral connec-
tions between human rights and international peace have been well recog-
nized, therefore, and need not be belabored here. 223 What has taken a
little longer to gain broad acceptance is the importance of timely U.N.
intervention in domestic political processes before problems arising from
failures in such proceses threaten human rights and international peace
and security.
Each new instance of U.N. involvement in national politics helps fur-
ther erode artificial barriers separating groups of human beings into "sepa-
rate, competitive, and minimally cooperating sovereign states ... -224
principles. See, e.g., Bilhari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOREIGN POL'Y 24
(1993). But see Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asian Debate, 15 Aus-
TRAL Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1994). The latter have grown increasingly irrelevant as their
opposition to foreign domination have often led them to uncritical support for state
power. Id.; JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 118
(1989).
220. See Franck, supra note 11, at 90-91; UNrr NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, 1945-1995, supra note 38, at 92-99, 112-18. It is important to stress,
however, that this human rights consensus would remain superficial as long as the con-
tent of human rights remains artificially compartmentalized, with economic and devel-
opment concerns relegated.to secondary and tertiary considerations (as national/private
as opposed to being international/public) in the propaganda of insurgent liberal democ-
racy. The consensus on humarl rights must be open to dynamic challenges to liberal
democratic orthodoxy.
221. Fox, supra note 8; Franck, supra note 11, at 92-99, 112-18; Lewis, supra note 100.
222. See GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 23, at 60-72. The General Assembly has been
very clear on several occasions that it does have the power to deal with all violations of
Charter provisions of human rights. Id. The problem has been that concrete steps to
prevent or punish violations must emanate from the Security Council, a body that has
generally insisted upon a finding of an international dimension, that is a threat to or a
breach of international peace and security. See U.N. CHARmR arts. 33-42. See also Gas-
sama, supra note 25 (discussing the Security Council's reluctance to punish apartheid
South Africa); Gassama, supra note 65, at 279-81.
223. The U.N. Secretary-General affirmed the integral relationship between human
rights and international peace and security when he endorsed an expanded U.N. role in
support of human rights in the Agenda for Peace report issued in 1992: "The sources of
conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them will require our utmost effort to
enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms ...." BoUtRos BoUrRoS-
GHAUi, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 40 (1995).
224. WESTON, Er AL., supra note 19, at 1069.
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thereby creating opportunities for a creative and humane reconsideration
of our present world order. There hardly can be dearer demonstrations of
support by people in oppressed societies for an external, supra-national
entity to which they can turn for support when their domestic institutions
have failed them than an embrace of international participation in their
national elections.
The popular endorsement of international participation in domestic
political processes has generated a high level of participation in interna-
tional electoral missions from diverse national and international non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs). Many of these organizations work
closely with the U.N. The NGOs are a critical part of a growth industry
committed to marketing the liberal democratic model to countries newly
liberated from oppressive leadership and desperate to attract western
investment. This growth industry follows in the wake of a remarkable tide
of movements and leaders who have (re)discovered the seductive language
of liberal democracy and, at least in public pronouncements, accept the
dominant Western interpretations of universal human rights guaran-
tees.225 While one could remain skeptical of the depth and duration of
this new-found "religion," it is difficult to discount its potency.226 For
those convinced of the inadequacy of liberal democracy in dealing with
fundamental socio-economic issues dividing the world, a better strategy
might be to employ the energy and enthusiasm generated by liberal demo-
cratic principles in support of a comprehensive examination of socio-eco-
nomic relationships, within and across national boundaries.
Support'for such a comprehensive reexamination of socio-economic
relationships could come from those who have been part of the "business"
of elections verification, either directly on behalf of the United Nations or
as employees or volunteers for human rights NGOs. These individuals con-
stitute a new corps of international human rights advocates who have
established close working ties transcending national boundaries. While
deeply suspicious of the roles of the major powers and the U.N. bureau-
cracy, these human rights workers are also cognizant of the U.N.'s tremen-
225. See, e.g., Statements of representatives of several countries in response to Haitian
President Aristides plea for help to the U.N. Security Council shortly after the 1991
coup that removed him as Haiti's first democratically elected leader. U.N. Security
Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and Eleventh Meeting,
U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3011 (1991). Fox cites a study that identified twenty nine "democratic"
countries in 1960, and a survey that identified sixty five such countries by 1990. Fox,
supra note 8, at 540. Thomas Franck estimated that, "As of late 1991, there are more
than 110 governments, almost all represented in the United Nations, that are legally
committed to permitting open, multiparty, secret-ballot elections with a universal
franchise." He added, "Most joined the trend in the past five years." Franck, supra note
11, at 47. See generally FREEDoM HousE SuRvEY TEAM, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE
ANNUAL SURVEY OF PourncAL RiGHTs AND CrvI. LimTIEs, 1993-94 (1994).
226. This point is underscored by the responses of many countries to the 1991 mili-
tary coup against the Aristide government in Haiti's. Many of the governments that con-
demned the coup and urged international effort to restore democracy in Haiti-Cuba,
Cote d'Ivoire, and Zaire, for example-have been strongly criticized for not living up to
democratic standards. See U.N. SEcuRrY CoUNCIL, PROvIsIONAL VERBATIM REcoRD OF
THE THREE THOUSAND AND ELEvENTH MEErING, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3011 (1991).
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dous possibilities for aiding the development of democracy and human
rights. However, given the option to start afresh, many might suggest a
type of vehicle very different from the U.N. for advancing global human
rights. Given the commitments represented by the U.N. Charter and the
resources already expended to make the U.N. system more cognizant of its
human rights responsibilities, it would seem more sensible to focus on
improving the U.N. role. It is for this reason that in June 1993, human
rights advocates argued in Vienna for the universality, objectivity, non-
selectivity, interdependence and equality of rights; it is also the reason why
in September 1995 advocates travelled to Beijing to affirm that "women's
rights are human rights."227
Conclusion
Human rights advocates understand from experience that complete protec-
tion for all comes only from a recognition that every human being has a
vested interest in seeing that no one's fundamental human rights are vio-
lated behind a shield of "national sovereignty" or "domestic jurisdic-
tion."228 Human rights advocates insist that the U.N. act as a
representative of both popular and governmental interests, with a direct
responsibility to the "peoples of the United Nations,"229 a responsibility
that ought not be subject entirely to the desires of those who claim sover-
eign control over people.
There is still, however, considerable support for shielding from inter-
national scrutiny the manner in which the citizens of a country choose
their government. The U.N. charter and many other international legal
documents are replete with reminders of the traditional defenses accorded
to nation states.230 Legal principles, such as the sovereign equality of
states and a doctrine of non-interference in matters essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of states, continue to provide ready defenses against
international efforts to scrutinize or improve the behavior of governments
227. On the role of NGOs at the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, see THE
UNITED NATIONS AND HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 35, at 92; on the role of NGOs in the
Fourth World Conference on Women, see Breaking New Ground... Woman's Conference
Adopts Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1995, at 29. See
generally David Weissbrodt, The Contributions of International Nongovernmental Organi-
zations to the Protection of Human Rights, in HumAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIoNAL LAw 403
(Theodor Meron ed., 1984); Henry Steiner, Diverse Partners: Non-Governmental Organi-
zations in the Human Rights Movement, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 146, at 457-59,
462-66. For a less celebratory view of the contributions of many western-based NGOs
who operate across national boundaries, see Mutua, supra note 21.
228. See HENmN, supra note 53, at 51-64.
229. See RussELL, supra note 107 on the background to the language of the Preamble
to the U.N. Charter.
230. U.N. CHAnE art. 2 (7) is the principal provision generally cited in support of
this sovereignty defense: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter. . ." See also U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(1) ("The Organization is
based on the the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.").
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toward their citizens. None of these principles, however, promotes suffi-
cient respect for the interests of people or communities within countries.
On the contrary, these principles perpetuate the tragic myth that the inter-
ests of people are one with those of their national governments, a position
reflecting a shocking failure to fully appreciate one of the major lessons of
the international human rights movement.
The international validation of national governance through verifica-
tion missions has helped to weaken the protections that sovereignty-based
concepts have historically provided to governments of nation states. Dis-
placing the predicates- international dimension, request from government,
and self-determination-that have constrained U.N. involvement in national
politics should aid the triumph of the human rights imperative in ensuring
universality, indivisibility and interdependence of human rights.
U.N. intervention in the "domestic jurisdiction" or "internal affairs" of
sovereign states through guardianship of the processes of selecting
national leaders would bolster the position of human rights advocates who
have long advocated stripping away those doctrinal barriers which frus-
trate and deter citizens who have been abused by their governments from
gaining meaningful international recognition and support.231 The U.N.
could also promote a deeper understanding of democracy that recognizes
the interrelationship between the national and the international, the polit-
ical and the economic, as well as between the public and the private.
231. Steiner observes that oppressive governments cannot grant the right to political
participation without signing their death warrants. Steiner, supra note 30, at 930. U.N.
guardianship of a more comprehensive version of the right to political participation
would speed up the extinction of this vile and obstinate species.

